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Abstract
In recent years many countries have introduced fiscal rules with the purpose
of reducing the incentives for local governments to accumulate public debt
and run deficits. Despite wide adoption, there is not enough evidence about
the consequences of fiscal rules for the quality of the political process.
In this PhD dissertation, exploiting panel data on Italian municipalities
and an institutional framework which mandates the application of fiscal rules
only for municipalities above 5000 inhabitants, I study how fiscal rules af-
fect the quality of the political process. In particular, in Chapter 1, using
a Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) design, I study how fiscal rules
affect the quality of the political class, and in particular the level of edu-
cation of politicians. In Chapter 2, using Regression Discontinuity Design
and Propensity-Score Matching, I study whether politicians characterized by
different levels of education make different choices in terms of fiscal policies
and whether they have different political career goals. Finally, in Chapter
3, I study how political parties can discipline politicians by affecting their
career concerns. In particular, using Regression Discontinuity Design, I show
that national parties can act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining
politicians.
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Introduction
In the last years several countries have introduced fiscal rules designed to
constrain the fiscal behaviour of governments. These are laws that have the
aim of limiting the incentives to accumulate public debt and run deficits.
In most cases, fiscal rules are a tool that central governments use to dis-
cipline the behaviour of local governments, based on a rationale that fiscal
indiscipline at the local level has a negative effect on fiscal discipline at the
central level.
As described by Grembi et al. (2016), there are many examples of coun-
tries that in recent years have adopted fiscal rules designed to constrain the
fiscal behaviour of local governments. Among them, we can find both devel-
oped (e.g. Canada, Italy, Spain, Sweden) and developing (e.g. Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, China) countries. Perhaps, the most famous example of fiscal
rules is the European Stability Pact, which is a set of rules imposed by the
European Union on the member countries.
Despite the recent diffusion, there is no agreement in the economics lit-
erature about whether fiscal rules are effective in fostering fiscal stability.
In particular, some scholars (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, and Wyplosz, 2012)
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argue that, for reasons of lack of commitment, fiscal rules may not work. Be-
sides that, there is little evidence on the consequences of fiscal rules for the
quality of government and of the political process. In fact, most of the studies
are focused on the effectiveness of fiscal rules in reducing the incentives to
accumulate public debt and run deficits (Alesina et al., 1996; Hallerberg and
Von Hagen, 1999; Debrun et al., 2008; Poterba, 1994; 1996). Finally, most of
the empirical evidence, with the exception of the recent work of Grembi et al.
(2016) and Coviello et al. (2016), has been developed through cross-country
comparisons. All of this leaves the door open to more research on the effect
of fiscal rules on the quality of the political process.
In this PhD dissertation, I study how fiscal rules can directly affect and
indirectly interact with the quality of the political process. I use panel data
on political, socio-economic and geographical characteristics of all the Italian
municipalities for the years 1993 to 2012.
Italian municipalities offer an interesting framework that can be exploited
to study how fiscal rules interact with the political process. In fact, as de-
scribed in more detail below, in 1999 the Italian central government intro-
duced fiscal rules, aimed at reducing the incentives to accumulate debt and
run deficits, which initially applied to all Italian municipalities. These rules
were introduced under the name “Domestic Stability Pact" (DSP). In 2001,
to avoid imposing onerous constraints on small municipalities disadvantaged
by economies of scale, the central government removed the fiscal rules for mu-
nicipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. This relaxation below the 5000
threshold remained in place until 2013, when the threshold was reduced to
13
1000.
Thus, the particular framework represented by Italian municipalities can
be exploited to analyse how fiscal rules interact with the political process in
two ways: 1) in Chapter 1, I study the direct effect of fiscal rules on the
quality of the political class; 2) in Chapters 2 and 3, I apply a more indirect
approach through which I analyse how the absence or presence of fiscal rules
can shape the incentives received by different types of politicians.
Chapter 1 (“Fiscal rules and the selection of politicians: evidence from
Italian municipalities”) represents a direct test of the effect of fiscal rules on
the quality of the political process. In particular, in this chapter, using data
on Italian municipalities and exploiting a Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-
Disc) design, which enables control for an institutionally mandated increase
in the wage paid to politicians at the 5000 threshold, I provide the following
empirical evidence: 1) I show that the imposition of fiscal rules negatively
affects the quality of the political class, and in particular the level of education
of politicians; 2) consistent with the idea that competent individuals want to
enter the political arena if they are given enough discretion in setting fiscal
policies, I demonstrate that the main results are driven by municipalities not
burdened by high levels of deficit; 3) I show that the introduction of fiscal
rules effectively offsets the positive effect of a wage increase on the selection
of politicians.
Thus, the empirical evidence described by Chapter 1 suggests that, while
paying politicians high wages may be a good idea since more skilled individ-
uals are attracted by high remuneration, reducing the power and discretion
14
of a government through the imposition of fiscal rules may have negative
consequences on the selection of politicians.
In Chapter 2 (“Do educated politicians matter for fiscal outcomes? Ev-
idence from Italian municipalities”), I study how the absence or presence of
fiscal rules can shape, in different ways, the behaviour of politicians with dif-
ferent levels of education. The goal of Chapter 2 is to understand whether
politicians with different education levels take different decisions in terms
of fiscal policies and whether they follow different political career paths. In
particular, the focus is on the comparison between politicians with a college
degree and politicians without a degree. The comparison is implemented
by distinguishing between municipalities affected by the application of fiscal
rules and those not affected by them. The same dataset is used in Chapter
2 and Chapter 1, and the results in Chapter 2 must be read in conjunction
with those reported in Chapter 1.
The analysis reported in Chapter 2 is developed with two different method-
ologies: 1) Regression Discontinuity Design, which compares municipalities
in which a candidate with a college degree barely won with municipalities in
which a candidate with a degree barely lost; 2) Propensity-Score Matching
implemented using the subset of tight mixed electoral competitions between
graduate and non-graduate candidates.
The main results indicate that graduate mayors elected in municipalities
not constrained by fiscal rules tend to run higher deficits compared to mayors
without a college degree. These higher deficits seem to be produced by reduc-
ing revenues more than expenditures. On the other hand, it was not possible
15
to find any significant difference in terms of fiscal policies for municipalities
constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. municipalities above 5000).
In Chapter 2 I show that graduate mayors seem to be more career oriented,
as I find that they have a higher probability of being elected at the provincial
level (i.e. the level of government immediately above municipalities). This
may indicate that they run higher deficits in order to pursue their career
goals.
Therefore, the empirical evidence described in Chapter 2 indicates that
more educated politicians have stronger preferences for higher deficits and are
more career oriented. This may explain why, as reported in Chapter 1, more
educated individuals are less likely to enter politics in institutional contexts
constrained by fiscal rules.
In Chapter 3 (“Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian
municipalities”), I study how, in municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules,
political parties can discipline politicians by affecting their career prospects.
In particular, in Chapter 3, I exploit the proliferation in Italian municipali-
ties of local movements (“Civic Lists”) completely independent from political
parties, and I use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians
to test whether political parties discipline politicians by affecting their career
concerns. In practice, using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) which
compares municipalities where party-affiliated mayors barely won with those
where they barely lost, I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally
responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expendi-
tures. As anticipated above, the effect found in this final chapter is significant
16
only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that na-
tional parties can act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians.
Besides that, in Chapter 3, I also provide evidence that the fiscal disci-
pline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects. In
fact, mayors affiliated to national parties have a higher probability of being
re-elected for a second term and higher chances of being promoted to higher
levels of government. Finally, I show that the results are not driven by po-
litical orientation, alignment with the central government, the presence of
criminal organizations nor unobserved political ability.
In conclusion, the main takeaways of this PhD dissertation about the in-
teraction of fiscal rules with the quality of the political process are as follows.
First, as described in Chapter 1, fiscal rules seem to have a negative effect
on the selection of more educated individuals. This is consistent with the
empirical evidence described in Chapter 2, which indicates that more edu-
cated politicians have stronger preferences for higher deficits. This represents
a potential drawback of fiscal rules, which make holding political office less
attractive for more educated individuals.
Second, the results of Chapters 1 and 2 suggest that fiscal rules have two
separate effects on fiscal policies: 1) a direct effect, as on average munici-
palities affected by fiscal rules run lower deficits (see empirical analysis by
Grembi et al., 2016); and 2) an indirect effect, as fiscal rules discourage the
entry of politicians with stronger preferences for higher deficits.
Therefore, Chapters 1 and 2 indicate that fiscal rules have both positive
and negative consequences. On the positive side, they foster fiscal stabil-
17
ity through both incentives and selection. On the negative side, fiscal rules
discourage the entry of more educated individuals. These conclusions leave
the door open for future research. In particular, it would be interesting to
complete this analysis with data on the production of public goods.
Finally, national political parties, through their effect on the political ca-
reers of politicians, may be an institution which can substitute for fiscal rules
in constraining politicians. Hence, in those contexts where political parties
are strong or particularly well connected to higher levels of government, it
may be better to not impose fiscal rules, as they may simply be a useless
burden which reduces discretion and flexibility enjoyed by local governments.
18
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Chapter 1
Fiscal rules and the selection of
politicians: evidence from Italian
municipalities
Abstract
Many countries have recently introduced fiscal rules to constrain governments’
fiscal policies and action. Despite the wide adoption, there is little evidence
on the consequences of fiscal rules for the quality of government. I use data
from Italian municipalities to study how fiscal rules affect the selection of
politicians. In 1999, the Italian government applied fiscal rules to all mu-
nicipalities, and in 2001 it removed them for municipalities with less than
5000 inhabitants. Using a Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) design,
which enables control for an institutionally mandated increase in the wage
paid to politicians at the 5000-inhabitant threshold, I provide the following
empirical evidence: 1) fiscal rules negatively affect the quality of politicians,
and in particular their level of education; 2) consistent with the idea that
competent individuals enter politics if they are given enough discretion, the
effect is driven by municipalities with low deficits; 3) fiscal rules offset the
21
positive effect of the wage increase on the selection of politicians.
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study how fiscal rules designed to constrain the fiscal policies
decided by a government can affect the selection of politicians. In particu-
lar, using data on Italian municipalities, I provide the following empirical
evidence: 1) I show that the imposition of fiscal rules, aimed at reducing
incentives to accumulate debt and run deficits, has a negative effect on the
quality of politicians; 2) the effect is stronger in municipalities with low levels
of past deficit, a result that is consistent with a framework in which compe-
tent individuals enter politics if they can enjoy a sufficient level of discretion;
3) I demonstrate that the introduction of fiscal rules effectively offsets the
positive selection effect of the wage rise that operates across the sample of
municipalities studied.
One of the goals of the political economy literature is to study how to
improve the political process in ways that generate benefits for voters. His-
torically, the focus of the literature has been on how to give the right incentives
to politicians (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). In particular, the literature, un-
der the assumption that politicians are all self-interested, has put a lot of
attention on re-election as a disciplining device. However, as noted by Besley
(2005), assuming that all politicians are self-interested implies that voters can
replace bad politicians with others who are just as bad.
For this reason, in recent years the political economy literature has started
22
to study the different mechanisms through which politicians are selected
(Besley, 2005). The main goal of this recent literature is to study how in-
stitutions affect the ex-ante quality of the political class, and in particular
to understand which institutions succeed in attracting the most competent
individuals into the political arena.
From a theoretical point of view, this has been made possible by the intro-
duction of the citizen-candidate framework developed by Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996), who have started to treat political
candidates as endogenous. On the other side, the empirical literature has pro-
vided evidence about how different types of institutions can affect the quality
of individuals who enter in politics. Among the institutions studied we can
find: 1) the wage paid to politicians (Besley, 2004; Ferraz and Finan, 2011;
Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011; Dal Bo et
al., 2013; Fisman et al., 2013; Braendle, 2015); 2) the role of outside earn-
ings (Gagliarducci et al., 2010; Fedele and Naticchioni, 2013; Grossman and
Hanlon, 2013); 3) the role of monitoring institutions (Grossman and Hanlon,
2013); 4) grants from higher levels of government and the level of fiscal au-
tonomy (Brollo et al., 2013; Bordignon et al., 2015); 5) electoral rules (Beath
et al., 2015); 6) gender quotas (Baltrunaite et al., 2014) and 7) criminal or-
ganizations (Daniele and Geys, 2015). As far as I know, no study to date has
investigated the potential effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians.
Fiscal rules are rules that constrain fiscal policies. In particular, National
central governments generally use fiscal rules to discipline the fiscal behaviour
of local governments, to reduce their incentives to accumulate debt and run
23
deficits. The rationale for fiscal rules is that fiscal indiscipline at the local
level represents a negative externality for the rest of the country. This is
particularly the case in decentralized countries in which the local governments
are financed through transfers from higher levels of governments, and local
governments may not entirely internalize the cost of spending.
As reported by Grembi et al. (2016), in recent years many countries have
adopted rules to constrain the fiscal policies of local governments. These in-
clude Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. Maybe the
most famous rule is the European Stability Pact, which was introduced in
1997 by the European Union and applied on member countries. In spite of
the wide use of fiscal rules, there is no definitive evidence in the economics
literature about whether they foster fiscal stability. In fact, some studies
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996, and Wyplosz, 2012) indicate that for reasons of
commitment, fiscal rules may not work. From this point of view, the most
recent advancement in the literature is Grembi et al. (2016), who, using data
on Italian municipalities, have shown that fiscal rules can be effective in re-
ducing the deficit run by local governments. Another recent paper is Coviello
et al. (2016), who study the impact of fiscal rules on public infrastructure
expenditures and the size of firms. As already mentioned, I am not aware of
any study of the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians.
The claim of this chapter is that the imposition of fiscal rules on local
governments may have a negative effect on the ex-ante quality of the political
class. The idea behind this claim is that competent and skilled individuals
24
may find it less attractive to enter the political arena if the power, the flexi-
bility and the discretion of a government are constrained by the fiscal rules.
In fact, fiscal rules, while they may be effective in decreasing the incentives
to accumulate debt and run deficits, may reduce the flexibility enjoyed by a
local government in setting its own fiscal policies. This negative effect on the
selection of politicians may be even stronger if competent and skilled indi-
viduals enter the political arena with the goal of pursuing a political career
(i.e. they are more career oriented compared to less competent individuals),
as politicians constrained by fiscal rules may find it more difficult to reach
this goal.
In this chapter, I directly investigate whether the introduction of fiscal
rules in Italian municipalities has negatively affected the level of human capi-
tal of the political class. The results of this chapter must be read in connection
with those found in Chapter 2, in which I show that more competent mayors
elected in Italian municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules tend to run
higher deficits and to be more career oriented, compared to less competent
ones. 1
The main measure of politicians’ competence used in this chapter is their
level of education, which is an indicator of the ex-ante quality of the political
class that has been widely used in the literature on the selection of politicians
(e.g., Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). In
1In particular, in Chapter 2 I show that mayors with a college degree elected in mu-
nicipalities not constrained by fiscal rules, compared to non-graduate mayors, tend to run
higher deficits, reducing revenues more than expenditures. At the same time, in Chapter
2 I demonstrate that graduate mayors have a higher probability of being elected at the
provincial level, which is the level of government immediately above the municipal level.
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particular, competence is measured by both average years of education and
the proportion of politicians with a college degree. I provide evidence on other
individual characteristics of the politicians, such as gender, age, employment
status and political experience.
The empirical analysis uses data on Italian municipalities from 1993 to
2012. Italian municipalities are an interesting framework for the empirical
question investigated in this chapter. In fact, as described in Section 1.2, in
1999 the Italian government introduced fiscal rules, with the goal of limiting
the incentives to accumulate debt and run deficits. These rules initially ap-
plied to all municipalities and were introduced under the name of "Domestic
Stability Pact" (DSP). In 2001, the central government removed the rules for
all municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. This was done to avoid im-
posing additional constraints on municipalities disadvantaged by economies
of scale. This relaxation remained in place until 2013, when the cutoff was
moved from 5000 to 1000.
This institutional framework would be ideal for a Regression Discontinuity
Design, if fiscal rules were the only policy that changes at the 5000 threshold.
However, as described by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) and Grembi et
al. (2016), at the same cut-off there is a sharp increase in the wage paid
to the mayor and the municipal ministers, based on a policy introduced by
the Italian government in the 1960s. This represents a counfounding policy,
as Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), using data on Italian municipalities
between 1993 and 2001, have already shown that the wage increase at 5000
affects the selection of politicians attracting more educated individuals into
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politics. For this reason, following Grembi et al. (2016), I exploit the 2001
removal of fiscal rules for municipalities below 5000 to estimate a Difference-
in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) model, which allows estimation of the effect
of fiscal rules on political selection separately from that of the wage increase.
The main results of this chapter show that fiscal rules have a negative
effect on the level of education of politicians. In fact, following the 2001
removal of fiscal rules for municipalities below the 5000 threshold, the level
of education of politicians increased more in the municipalities just below the
threshold, compared to those just above. In particular, the main specification
used indicates that, following the 2001 removal of fiscal rules, the percentage
of all municipal politicians with a college degree increased by approximately
12 % in municipalities just below the threshold, compared to those just above.
This implies a relative rise in the average years of education equal to 0.64 years
(i.e. approximately 7.68 months of education). At the same time, the same
main specification shows that, following the 2001 relaxation of fiscal rules,
the percentage of mayors with a college degree increased by around 27.2 %
in the municipalities just below the threshold, compared to those affected by
fiscal rules. This implies a relative increase in the average years of education
of mayors of about 1.5 years.
It is important to highlight two important features of these main results:
1) in the graphical analysis, I show that the rise in the level of education of
politicians in municipalities just below the 5000 threshold is consistent with a
general increasing trend in the level of education in both the Italian popula-
tion and the entire sample of all municipal politicians. Thus, the presence of
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fiscal rules offset this increasing trend in education in towns just above 5000
inhabitants, while those just below were free to grow 2; 2) while in the years
before 2001, given the higher wage paid above 5000 inhabitants to both the
mayors and the municipal ministers (see Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013),
municipalities just above the threshold were selecting more educated politi-
cians, this difference disappeared after the 2001 removal of fiscal rules for
municipalities below the 5000 threshold. This suggests that the imposition
of fiscal rules, which reduced the power and the discretion of municipal gov-
ernments, apparently cancelled the positive effect of the wage increase on the
level of education of politicians.
Thus, the empirical evidence described by the main results of this chapter
can be seen as an indication that, while paying politicians high wages may be
a good idea, as more skilled individuals are attracted by high remunerations,
competent persons may decide to enter politics for many different reasons:
the empirical results of this chapter suggest that reducing the power and
discretion of a government through the imposition of fiscal rules may have a
negative effect on the selection of skilled individuals.
The results of the main specification survive a series of robustness checks:
first of all, I show that the results in terms of political selection are not driven
2The fact that, as shown in Section 1.5.2, the level of education of politicians was
increasing in the entire sample of all Italian municipalities may indicate that the same
thing was happening in the bigger municipalities excluded from the analysis of this chapter
(i.e. those far away from the 5000 threshold). In fact, this was the case, even though these
municipalities were affected by fiscal rules as well. This can be explained by the fact that
bigger municipalities, compared to those considered in this chapter, may offer politicians
bigger opportunities in terms of visibility and career perspectives. In fact, the spirit of
the Diff-in-Disc analysis used in this chapter is to compare municipalities just below the
5000 threshold with those just above, which represent a much better and more similar
comparison group.
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by the imbalance in the level of deficit around the 5000 threshold before and
after 2001, due to the fact that municipalities just below the 5000 threshold,
if compared to those just above, started to run higher deficits after the 2001
relaxation (see Grembi et al., 2016). To the contrary, I show that the main
results are driven by municipalities characterized by a low level of deficit, if
not by a surplus. This is consistent with the idea that competent individuals
want to enter politics if they are given enough power and discretion, conditions
that probably are not guaranteed by those municipalities not constrained by
fiscal rules, but characterized by high deficits.
Secondly, through a falsification test implemented using pre-2001 data, I
show that municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold did
not react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999. This indicates
that high-wage and low-wage municipalities did not react differently to the
introduction of fiscal rules, excluding a potential interaction between the two
policies that may have affected the selection of politicians. This falsification
test also provide evidence that the two groups of municipalities around the
5000 threshold were on parallel trends before the 2001 relaxation. Then, I
show that other potential outcomes and municipal characteristics are bal-
anced around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001. Finally, I exclude
the possibility of manipulative sorting of population figures around the 5000
threshold before and after 2001.
This chapter is connected to two strands of literature. The first is the lit-
erature on the selection of politicians described above. As already noted, this
literature has produced both theoretical insights (Besley and Coate, 1997;
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Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Caselli and Morelli, 2004) and empirical results
(for a survey see Braendle, 2016) about how different types of institutions can
affect the ex-ante quality of the political class. The second is the literature
about the effectiveness of fiscal rules. Most of the empirical evidence that
comes from this literature has been produced through cross-country compar-
isons (Alesina et al., 1996; Hallerberg and Von Hagen, 1999; Debrun et al.,
2008) or using data on U.S. States (Poterba, 1994; 1996). As previously
stated, two recent papers have produced significant progresses in the study
of fiscal rules using Italian data: 1) Grembi et al. (2016), who, using data on
Italian municipalities, have shown that fiscal rules can be effective in reducing
the deficit run by local governments; 2) Coviello et al. (2016), who study the
impact of fiscal rules on public infrastructure expenditures and the size of
firms. As already said, I am not aware of any study on the effect of fiscal
rules on the selection of politicians.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the Italian institu-
tional framework. Section 1.3 describes the data used in the chapter. Section
1.4 lays out the empirical strategy used in the chapter. Section 1.5 discusses
the empirical results and the validity tests. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting
In Italy there are 8047 municipalities, of which 70.5 % have less than 5000
inhabitants. Municipalities are responsible for a large number of services:
municipal police, infrastructure, transport, welfare, housing, environmental
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services (e.g. garbage collection), public utilities (e.g. water supply). They
manage 10 % of total public expenditures and around 20 % of their revenues
come from local taxes, while the rest are made up of discretionary transfers
from higher levels of government 3. Among local taxes, the most important
are the property tax and a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents.
The property tax was introduced in 1993 by Legislative Decree 504/1992,
while the surcharge on the personal income tax was introduced in 1999.
Since 1993 (see Law 81 in 1993) mayors of Italian municipalities are di-
rectly elected by the voters. In municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants they
are elected using a single round plurality rule, while a run-off system is used
above the same threshold. Mayors are elected for a term of five years and
for a maximum of two consecutive terms, i.e. they face a two-term limit. In
the context of the municipal government, mayors are quite powerful, as they
can choose and dismiss the ministers that form part of the municipal govern-
ment. Besides that, if the municipal council wants to dismiss the mayor, new
elections must be held.
The main focus of this chapter is on the effect of fiscal rules on the selection
of politicians. Fiscal rules for municipal governments were introduced in Italy
in 1999, following the introduction of the European Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), which was signed in 1997 by different European countries. Some of
the countries that adhered to the SGP, to respect the limits imposed by it,
3In particular transfers come from provinces, regions and the central state. It is impor-
tant to notice that the level of fiscal dependence on grants from higher levels of government
has been historically heterogeneous between the North and the South of Italy. For exam-
ple, in 2000 municipalities in the North were able to finance 70 % of their budget using
local taxes and revenues, while in the South grants covered 60-70 % of total expenditures
(Bordignon et al., 2015).
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introduced subnational fiscal rules aimed at disciplining local governments,
whose budgets form part of the total budget of the State. The subnational
rules in Italy were called the "Domestic Stability Pact" (DSP) 4.
The DSP is intended to reduce the incentives of local governments to
accumulate debt and run deficits. Table 1.1 describes the temporal evolution
over time of the target and the limits imposed on the target for the years 1999
to 2010. As we can see, the target has not been constant over time, though, for
most the years, the main target has been the balancing of local governments’
budgets. The limits imposed on the target have been changing over time:
in some years municipalities were asked to apply a cap to the growth of the
target with respect to a specific reference year, while in other years municipal
governments were asked to cut the target by a specific amount. Besides
that, in some years (e.g. 2007) the limits imposed on the target have been
differentiated depending on the past fiscal performance of a municipality (i.e.
one limit applied to virtuous municipalities, while another was applied to
undisciplined towns).
As we can see from Table 1.1, in the first two years (1999-2000) fiscal rules
applied to all municipalities, without distinction between small and large pop-
ulations. In 2001, the central government removed the fiscal rules for all the
municipalities below 5000 inhabitants, a decision taken to lift onerous con-
straints on municipalities disadvantaged by economies of scale. This decision
by the central government remained valid until 2013, when the threshold was
reduced from 5000 to 1000.
4Domestic Stability Pact stays for the Italian Patto Interno di Stabilita’. The Law that
introduced the DSP in Italy is the number 448, 23 December 1998, article 28.
32
In this chapter, I study the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians, exploiting the 2001 removal of fiscal rules for municipalities below the
5000 threshold. As explained in Section 1.4, this is done using a Difference-
in-Discontinuity approach (Grembi et al., 2016), as the presence of other
policies that change at the 5000 threshold does not allow the use of a stan-
dard Regression Discontinuity Design model. In fact, as described in Table
1.2, which reports the legislative population thresholds that apply to munic-
ipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants, the wages paid to the mayor and
the municipal ministers change at the 5000 threshold (Gagliarducci and Nan-
nicini, 2013). This wage increase at the 5000 threshold is a policy that dates
to the 1960s (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013). As described in Section 1.4,
the Difference-in-Discontinuity approach allows the estimation of the effect
of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians while controlling for the wage
increase.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 1.1, the claim of this chapter is that the
imposition of fiscal rules on local governments makes entering in the political
arena less attractive for skilled and competent individuals. This is because
skilled individuals may find a job whose power and flexibility are constrained
by fiscal rules less attractive. This may be even more true if skilled individ-
uals enter politics with the goal of pursuing a political career (i.e. they are
more career oriented), as politicians constrained by fiscal rules may find it
more difficult to reach this goal. From this point of view, Italian municipal-
ities offer an interesting framework for studying how the imposition of fiscal
rules affects the characteristics of the individuals who enter politics. This
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is because Grembi et al. (2016), using yearly data on Italian municipalities
and the same reform exploited in this chapter, have shown that fiscal rules
have been effective in constraining the fiscal behaviour of the municipal gov-
ernments. For this reason, I have decided to use this institutional setting to
study whether fiscal rules affect the selection of politicians.
1.3 Data
This dataset contains information about all politicians of Italian municipal-
ities with a population between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants elected between
1993 and 2012. It includes observable characteristics of politicians such as
gender, age, education level, professional background and past political expe-
rience. This information comes from the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
Information about the municipalities comes from the Italian Statistical
Office (Istat), and it includes the following municipal charcateristics: 1) ge-
ographical information as longitude, latitude, altitude and area; 2) the level
of education of the municipal population (e.g. percentage of the population
with a college degree); 3) socio-economic indicators such as income per capita;
4) other characteristics of the municipal population such as population den-
sity, the percentage of foreign individuals and the percentage of population
in different age ranges.
Finally, data on the budget outcomes for the years 2000 to 2012 comes
from the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
This chapter investigates the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians. In particular, the goal is to study how the imposition of fiscal rules,
which constrain the power and the discretion of local governments, affects the
types of people that decide to enter politics. The ideal framework to pursue
this goal would be represented by an experiment through which fiscal rules
are randomly assigned to different districts. However, running this kind of
experiment would be unfeasible for financial and institutional reasons.
A close approximation to this experiment exploits an institutional frame-
work that establishes population thresholds through which the assignment of
fiscal rules changes. In particular, the presence of a certain population thresh-
old, such that fiscal rules apply for local governments above the threshold but
not for those below, enables a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) which
compares local districts just above the threshold with those just below. Under
this design, in the absence of sorting and if other variables and treatments
do not change sharply at the specific threshold, the assignment of fiscal rules
can be considered as good as randomly assigned.
In this chapter I study the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians
using data from Italian municipalities. As described in Section 1.2, in 1999
the Italian government introduced fiscal rules aimed at reducing incentives to
accumulate debt and run deficits. These rules initially applied to all Italian
municipalities. In 2001, the rules were removed for municipalities with less
than 5000 inhabitants, and this difference across the 5000 threshold remained
valid until 2013.
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This institutional setup, in the absence of other policies changing across
the 5000 threshold, would be appropriate for an RDD approach applied to
the electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. However, as described in Section
1.2, fiscal rules are not the only policy that changes at the 5000 threshold.
At the same threshold there is a rise in the wage of the mayor and executive
officers, which dates to the 1960s.
This wage increase is a counfounding policy which would invalidate the
RDD approach, as it would be not possible to disentangle the effect of fiscal
rules from that of the wage increase. In fact, Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2013), using data on Italian municipalities between 1993 and 2001, have
shown that the wage increase at 5000 affects the selection of politicians, at-
tracting more educated individuals into politics. For these reasons a standard
RDD approach is not appropriate in this context.
However, as described by Grembi et al. (2016), the removal of fiscal
rules in 2001 for municipalities below 5000 can be exploited to implement a
Difference-in-Discontinuity (Diff-in-Disc) approach, which allows estimation
of the effect of fiscal rules separately from that of the wage increase. The
Diff-in-Disc approach represents a recent methodology (Lalive, 2008; Campa,
2011; Leonardi and Pica, 2013; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015; Grembi et al.,
2016) which combines the pre/post treatment variation typical of a Difference-
in-Differences design with a just below/just above a threshold variation that
characterizes an RDD approach. In the context of the Italian municipalities,
the idea is to combine the change generated by the 2001 reform with the
just below/just above 5000 threshold variation. This strategy, under some
36
assumptions described below, enables estimation of the effect of fiscal rules
on the selection of politicians, while controlling for the wage increase, which
is constant in real terms over time. Hence, in this framework, the Diff-in-
Disc approach represents the closest approximation to an experiment through
which the assignment of fiscal rules can be considered as good as randomly
assigned.
In particular, following Grembi et al. (2016), I estimate the following
empirical model:
Yit = ρ0+ ρ1Rit+Bi(β0+β1Rit)+Ft[pi0+pi1Rit+Bi(φ0+φ1Rit)]+ ηit (1.1)
where Rit = Pit − P5000 is the normalized population which measures the
distance of municipality i from the 5000 threshold P5000 at time t. The pop-
ulation Pit comes from the most recent census produced by the Italian Sta-
tistical Office (Istat), which is either in 1991 or 2001. The dummy variable
Bi is 1 if municipality i is below the 5000 threshold, while Ft is a temporal
dummy variable which is equal to 1 starting from the first election a munic-
ipality votes after 2001 5. The temporal dummy variable Ft has been built
in this way because the selection of (new) politicians can happen only during
electoral years, as it is quite rare that new politicians are selected during
the electoral mandate (i.e. far away from elections). The treatment variable
is the interaction term between Bi and Ft. Thus, the coefficient of interest
is φ0, which represents the Diff-in-Disc estimator and it captures the effect
5For a municipality that voted in 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2009 during the years of interest,
Ft is equal to 0 for the electoral terms 1995 and 1999 and equal to 1 for the electoral years
2004 and 2009.
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of the removal of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians in municipalities
below 5000. The dependent variable Yit measures different characteristics
of politicians, including education, age, gender, professional background and
past political experience.
Following the recent developments of Gelman and Imbens (2014), the
coefficient of interest φ0 is estimated by local linear regression (LLR). This
means that equation 1.1 is estimated using the subsample of observations
which lie in the interval Rit ∈ [−h,+h] around the threshold, where the
optimal bandwidth h is calculated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014a, 2014b). As an alternative to the CCT optimal bandwidth, I also
estimate the model using the smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250].
Finally, this identification strategy requires three main assumptions: 1)
there must not be manipulative sorting of the running variable Rit around
the 5000 threshold before and after 2001, such that municipalities must not
be able to self-select themselves and decide on which side of the cut-off to
stay. This is tested below with a density test (McCrary, 2008) of the popu-
lation around the 5000 threshold, using both the 1991 and 2001 population
censuses. Besides that, following Grembi et al. (2016), I also run the same
continuity test on the difference in the densities of the 2001 and 1991 cen-
sus populations; 2) other potential outcomes and municipal characteristics
must be balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001. This is
tested below by running model 1.1 using municipal characteristics as depen-
dent variables; 3) municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold
must be on parallel trends in the periods before the removal of the fiscal rules
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in 2001. In particular, as indicated by Grembi et al. (2016), there must be
no interaction between fiscal rules and the confounding policy, which is the
differential wage paid across the 5000 threshold. This assumption is required
in order to demonstrate that high-wage and low-wage municipalities did not
react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules. This is tested below with
a falsification test using the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999 and running
the Diff-in-Disc model using pre-2001 data. If this last assumption was valid,
this falsification test should deliver a zero effect.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Sample, descriptive statistics and balance tests
In Italy there are 8,047 municipalities, of which 70.5% have less than 5000
inhabitants. This study uses data on politicians in municipalities with a pop-
ulation between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants elected in the years from 1993 to
2012. The reasons for chosing this sample are: 1) as described in Section
1.2 and Table 1.2, different legislative population thresholds apply to Italian
municipalities. This chapter focuses on the 5000 threshold, at which both
the wage paid to the mayor and the application of fiscal rules change. At
the 3000 threshold there is another change to the wage paid of the mayor,
so I have excluded municipalities below this cut-off. Hence, for reasons of
symmetry and in order to work with groups of municipalities that share sim-
ilar characteristics, I have kept all municipalities that, during the years of
interest, have a population between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants; 2) in 2013
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the Italian government decided to apply the fiscal rules also to municipalities
between 1000 and 5000 inhabitants. For this reason I exclude the electoral
terms after 2012; 3) 1993 represents a crucial year for the Italian political sys-
tem. Following a huge corruption scandal called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands,
substantial reforms were made. Among the main changes are an electoral
law at the municipal level and the introduction of an important property tax,
managed by the mayors (for details see Bordignon, Gamalerio and Turati,
2015). For these reasons I exclude years before 1993. Finally, I retain in the
sample all municipalities for which I observe values of the dependent variables
both before and after the removal of fiscal rules in 2001.
This leaves me with a sample of 5,927 electoral terms. Among these
electoral terms, 1484 terms can be found within the window (-500,+500)
inhabitants around the 5000 threshold (793 below and 691 above), 907 (475
below and 432 above) within the range (-300,+300) and 273 (135 below and
138 above) within the range (-100,+100). Table 1.1 reports the summary
statistics of these 5,927 electoral terms, distinguishing between municipalities
below and municipalities above the 5000 threshold. The first panel of Table
1.1 reports the summary statistics relative to the dependent variables studied
in this chapter, i.e. the individual characteristics of municipal politicians. In
the second panel of Table 1.1 it is possible to find different characteristics of
the municipalities used in the empirical analysis, while the third panel reports
the level of education of the municipal population.
As reported in Section 1.4, one of the main assumptions required for the
Diff-in-Disc estimator to work in the context studied is that other potential
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outcomes and municipal characteristics must be balanced around the 5000
threshold before and after 2001. This assumption is required in order to
guarantee that the effects found on the selection of politicians are not driven
by other observable and/or unobservable factors. This is tested running the
Diff-in-Disc model 1.1 using municipal characteristics as dependent variables.
The results of this test are reported in the Appendix Table A.2, which
is divided into 3 different panels: 1) Panel A reports the balance tests on
different measures capturing the level of education of the municipal popula-
tion. As the main variables of interest of this chapter measure the level of
education of politicians, the tests in Panel A have been run to exclude the
possibility that municipalities below and above the 5000 threshold have dif-
ferent levels of education in their population. As we can see from Panel A
this does not seem to be the case. 2) Panel B of Table A.2 reports the results
of different characteristics of the municipal population. As we can see, all
the characteristics are balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after
2001, except the variable past deficit. This variable represents the deficit
per capita that a specific mayor inherits from her predecessor 6, and, as we
can see, the removal of fiscal rules has a positive effect on it. This result is
not surprising, given that Grembi et al. (2016), using yearly data on Ital-
ian municipalities and the same reform exploited in this chapter, have already
shown that fiscal rules have been effective in reducing the deficit per capita in
Italian municipalities. The imbalance in the variable past deficit represents
6i.e. this is the average level of deficit per capita at the moment in which new election
are held, which is when new politicians and new mayors may be chosen. For example, for a
municipality that voted in 1999 before the relaxation of fiscal rules and then in 2004 after
the reform, past deficit in 2004 is measured as the average deficit over the years 1999-2003.
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a threat to the identification strategy, because different levels of deficit start-
ing from 2001 below and above the threshold may have a direct effect on the
selection of politicians. Thus, past deficit represents a potential confounding
factor of the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians. As we will see
in Subsection 1.5.4, in which I deal directly with this potential threat, this
does not seem to be an issue for the identification strategy. 3) Panel C of
Table A.2 describes the balance tests for geographical characteristics of the
municipalities in the sample of interest. As we can see, all these variables are
balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001.
1.5.2 The effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians: graphical evidence
The main goal of this chapter is to study how the imposition of fiscal rules
aimed at reducing the accumulation of debt affects the characteristics of in-
dividuals who decide to enter in politics. In particular, the main focus is on
the level of education of politicians 7 , which is an indicator that has been
extensively used in the literature on political selection (Besley, 2005; Besley
and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Brollo et al., 2013; Gagliarducci and Nannicini,
2013).
The first simple way to provide empirical evidence of the effect of fiscal
rules on political selection is to look at the evolution of the level of education
of politicians over time. This is presented in graphs in Figures 1.1 - 1.4.
7In Subsection 1.5.5 I study the impact of fiscal rules also on other characteristics of
politicians.
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Figure 1.1 shows the general trends in the level of education of the en-
tire Italian population. In particular, it shows the evolution over time of the
percentage of the entire adult Italian population with a college degree. As
we can see, this percentage, while low relative to European standards 8, was
increasing during the period 1993-2009. As we can observe in Figure 1.2,
the same increasing trend can be found among the Italian politicians elected
at municipal level. Figure 1.2 contains four graphs: 1) the two top graphs
describe the evolution over time of the level of education of mayors elected
between 1995 and 2012. During these years both the average years of edu-
cation and the proportion of mayors with a college degree were increasing;
2) the two bottom graphs report the same behaviour for the average level
of education (as measured as average years of education and proportion of
graduate politicians) of all Italian politicians elected at municipal level.
Two main features of Figure 1.2 are worth noticing: 1) the average level
of education of municipal politicians in Italy seems to be higher than that of
the entire Italian population. In fact, between 1993 and 2009, the percentage
of the adult Italian population with a college degree increased from about 5
% to about 13 %. The same measure over the same period increased from
about 40 % to almost 45 % for mayors, and from about 23 % to about 30
% for all municipal politicians. Hence, Italian politicians seem to have a
higher level of education compared to the general population; 2) following
the increasing trend over time of the level of education of politicians, it is
noteworthy that the biggest jumps happened in electoral years during which
8Eurostat in 2015 reported that the percentage of individuals aged 30-34 years old with
a college degree in Italy was 23.9 %, against a European average of 37.9 %.
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most of the municipalities held municipal elections9. This is the case for
the electoral years 2004 and 2009, during which more than half of Italian
municipalities voted. This is not surprising, as the average level of education
of politicians usually only changes when new politicians are elected.
The first graphical evidence of the effect of fiscal rules on the level of edu-
cation of politicians is reported in Figure 1.3. This figure shows the evolution
over time of the dependent variables for the sample of municipalities between
3000 and 7000 inhabitants, which is the sample used in the rest of the chap-
ter for the regression analysis. Besides that, in Figure 1.3, I am splitting the
municipalities between those below 5000 inhabitants (the treatment group in
the Diff-in-Disc analysis) and those above 5000 (the control group). The red
vertical line represents the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999, which applied
to all municipalities. The green vertical line represents the relaxation of fiscal
rules in 2001 for municipalities below the 5000 threshold. As we can see from
Figure 1.3, after the 2001 removal of fiscal rules the level of education of the
two groups, which was different in the previous years, started to converge. In
particular, in the period after 2001 the politicians’ level of education increased
more in the municipalities not affected by fiscal rules.
It is worth highlighting three important features of Figure 1.3: 1) in the
years before the 2001 relaxation, the level of education of both mayors and
9As described by Repetto (2016), for historical reasons and because a municipal leg-
islature can experience early interruptions, municipal elections in Italy are staggered. In
particular, in Italy is more or less possible to recover 5 groups of municipalities that almost
always vote at the same time (unless early interruptions happen). Among these groups,
the biggest one, which is composed of more than half of all municipalities, is represented
by those towns that in the past voted in the electoral years 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009 and
2014.
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the entire pool of elected politicians was much lower in municipalities below
the 5000 threshold. This is consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013) who, using data on Italian municipalities between 1993 and
2001, have already shown how the wage increase at 5000 affected the selection
of politicians, attracting more educated individuals into politics; 2) it is not
possible to recover from Figure 1.3 a clear effect on the selection of politicians
determined by the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999, which applied to all
Italian municipalities 10. In particular, the introduction of fiscal rules in
1999 did not seem to change the pattern determined in the previous years
by the different wage paid across the 5000 threshold 11, as municipalities
below 5000 continued to attract less competent individuals until 2001, which
represents the real breaking point. This can be explained by the fact that
the introduction of fiscal rules was decided only in December 1998 12, just
before the big municipal elections in June 1999 (during which more than
half of the municipalities voted): this represents too short a period of time
for fiscal rules to affect candidatures, which were probably already decided
in December 1998; 3) while for the entire pool of politicians there is not a
complete convergence in the level of education, we can observe one for mayors.
10There is an apparent decline in the level of education of mayors around 1999 for munic-
ipalities below the 5000 threshold. As we will see both in Figure 1.4 and in the regression
analysis, this does not seem to be driven by municipalities close the 5000 thresholds, which
are those driving the estimated results in the Diff-in-Disc analysis. In fact, in the regres-
sion analysis, using the Diff-in-Disc estimator, I show that municipalities just below and
just above the threshold did not react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999.
11In fact, Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) in their analysis of the effect of wage on the
selection of politicians include also the electoral years 1999-2001, during which the only
difference between municipalities below and above the 5000 threshold was represented by
the wage paid to the mayors and the executive officers.
12See Law 23 December 1998, no. 448, article 28.
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In fact, in the top two graphs of Figure 1.3 both the average years of education
and the proportion of graduate mayors of municipalities below 5000 reached
the level of those above after 2001. In particular, while in municipalities below
5000 the level of education of politicians after 2001 continued to follow the
same increasing trend observed for the entire sample of Italian municipalities,
in towns above 5000 both the average years of education and the proportion
of graduate mayors remained more or less at the same level 13. This seems to
indicate that the imposition of fiscal rules, which reduced the power and the
discretion of mayors at the municipal level, apparently cancelled the positive
effect of the wage increase on the level of education of politicians. This is
an indication that, while paying politicians high wages may be a good idea
as more skilled individuals are attracted by higher remuneration, competent
persons may decide to enter in politics for many different reasons: Figure 1.3
offers some preliminary evidence that reducing the power and discretion of
politicians may have a negative effect on the selection of skilled individuals.
The same intuitions from Figure 1.3 are reinforced in Figure 1.4, in which
I report the evolution over time of the dependent variables for the sample of
municipalities between 4,400 and 5,600 inhabitants. The range closely resem-
bles the optimal bandwidth used in the Diff-in-Disc analysis below. As we
13The fact that, as shown in Figure 1.2, the level of education of politicians was increasing
in the entire sample of municipalities may indicate that the same thing was happening in
the bigger municipalities excluded from the analysis of this chapter (i.e. those above 7000
inhabitants). In fact, this was the case, even though these municipalities were affected
by fiscal rules as well (results are available upon request). This can be explained by the
fact that bigger municipalities, if compared to those used in this chapter, may offer to
politicians bigger opportunities in terms of visibility and career perspectives. In fact, the
spirit of the Diff-in-Disc analysis used in this chapter is to compare municipalities just
below the 5000 threshold with those just above, which represent a much better and more
similar comparison group.
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can see, restricting the sample to treatment and control groups composed by
more similar municipalities in terms of population size 14 further strengthens
the results found in Figure 1.3. This is true for both the mayors and the
entire pool of municipal politicians. In particular, we can see how for the
mayors, while in municipalities below 5000 the level of education continued
to follow the same increasing trend observed for the entire sample of munic-
ipalities, in towns above the 5000 threshold the level of education decreased
after 2001. The big changes in 2004 occur because 2004 sees the biggest mu-
nicipal election following the 2001 relaxation. This evidence seems to further
indicate that reducing the power and the discretion of politicians through the
imposition of fiscal rules may have a negative effect on the selection of skilled
individuals. Finally, as already said for Figure 1.3, the introduction of fiscal
rules in 1999 did not affect differentially the selection of politicians across
the 5000 threshold, as municipalities below 5000 continued to attract less
competent individuals until 2001, which represents the real breaking point.
1.5.3 The effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians: main results
In this subsection, I describe the results of the Diff-in-Disc analysis studying
the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians. As in the previous
subsection, the main focus is on the level of education. The analysis uses two
different samples: 1) the entire sample of municipalities between 3000 and
14As previously described, all the municipal characteristics around the 5000 threshold
are balanced. This indicates that municipalities with a similar population size share many
other common characteristics.
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7000 inhabitants for the electoral terms from 1993 to 2012; 2) the sample
of municipalities between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants for the electoral terms
from 1999 to 2005.
The first sample is composed of all the municipalities between 3000 and
7000 inhabitants for which I observe values of the dependent variables both
before and after the removal of fiscal rules in 2001. I use this sample through-
out this chapter.
The second sample is composed of two electoral years for each municipal-
ity: one before the relaxation and one after. This second sample has been
chosen for the following reasons: 1) to implement an empirical analysis that
excludes all the electoral years during which fiscal rules were not in place (i.e.
before 1999). In this sample, for all municipalities I can observe at most one
electoral year in the period before the reform (i.e. electoral years 1999-2000).
Thus, for reasons of symmetry, I limit this sample to just one electoral year
immediately after the relaxation of fiscal rules; 2) to run a series of hetero-
geneity mechanisms analysis and robustness checks which involve the role of
the variable past deficit, as described in the Subsections 1.5.1 and 1.5.4 and
3) to implement a falsification test for the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999,
in order to show that municipalities around the 5000 threshold did not react
differently to the introduction of fiscal rules. As described in Subsections
1.5.6, this is done using two electoral years for each municipality: one elec-
toral year before 1999 and one electoral year starting from 1999 (i.e. 1999 or
2000).
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the results of the empirical exercise developed
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using the entire sample of municipalities between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants
for the electoral terms between 1993 and 2012. The dependent variables in
these tables capture the level of education of mayors (Table 1.4) and of all
municipal politicians (Table 1.5): in Panel A of Table 1.4 the dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to one for mayors with a college degree ,
while in Panel A of Table 1.5 it is equal to the proportion of politicians with
a college degree; in Panel B of Table 1.4 the outcome is years of education of
mayors, while in Panel B of Table 1.5 it is the average years of education of
all politicians.
In these two tables I apply two different treatment variables: 1) (Relaxation
FR) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all the electoral terms starting from
2001, the year in which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities below the
5000 threshold. The interaction between (Relaxation FR) and the dummy
variable (< 5000) for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants repre-
sents the variable of interest of my analysis, which is meant to capture the
main effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politicians. This is reported in
all columns of Tables 1.4 and 1.5; 2) (Introduction FR) is a dummy variable
equal to one for the electoral years 1999-2000, during which fiscal rules were
introduced and were applied to all municipalities. I interact (Introduction
FR) with the dummy variable (< 5000) in order to study whether municipal-
ities just below and just above the 5000 threshold reacted differently to the
initial introduction of fiscal rules.
Besides that, introducing the interaction term (Introduction FR)*(<
5000) in the analysis makes it possible to change the baseline years (i.e. years
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before 2001, or years before the treatment is introduced) against which the
effect of the main treatment (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) must be interpreted:
1) in the specifications without (Introduction FR)*(< 5000), the baseline
electoral years are composed by a mix of years during which fiscal rules did
not apply (i.e. electoral years from 1993 to 1998) and years during which
fiscal rules applied to all municipalities (i.e. years 1999-2000); 2) in the spec-
ifications with (Introduction FR)*(< 5000), the baseline years are all the
years 1993-1998, during which fiscal rules were not in place. In practice,
introducing the interaction term (Introduction FR)*(< 5000) makse it pos-
sible to remove the transitory periods 1999-2000, during which fiscal rules
applied to all municipalities, from the interpretation of the main variable of
interest (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000). This gives an estimated coefficient that
describes how much the politicians’ level of education changed in munici-
palities just below the 5000 threshold, compared to those just above, in the
transition from a situation with no fiscal rules (years 1993-1998) to a world
in which fiscal rules apply only above 5000 (years starting from 2001).
In columns (1)-(2) of Tables 1.4 and 1.5, I report the results obtained us-
ing the optimal range calculated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014a, 2014b). In columns (3)-(4), I report the results obtained using the
smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250]. As we can see, both Tables 1.4 and 1.5
confirm the results of the graphical analysis described in Subsection 1.5.2: all
the estimated coefficients confirm that, following the removal of fiscal rules
below the 5000 threshold, the level of education of municipal politicians in-
creased more in the municipalities just below the threshold, compared to those
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just above. In particular, the specification with the optimal bandwidth in col-
umn (1) of Table 1.4 indicates that, following the removal of fiscal rules, the
percentage of mayors with a college degree increased by around 27.2 % in the
municipalities just below the threshold, compared to those affected by fiscal
rules. This implies an increase in the average years of education of mayors of
around one year and a half. The same specification in column (1) of Table 1.5
shows that the percentage of all municipal politicians with a college degree
increased by approximately 12 %, with a rise in the average years of education
equal to 0.64 years (i.e. approximately 7.68 months of education). As we can
notice, the introduction of the interaction term (Introduction FR)*(< 5000)
leaves the estimated coefficients of interest almost unchanged. This is due to
the fact that municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold did
not react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999, given that all
the coefficients of (Introduction FR)*(< 5000) are not statistically different
from zero. This indicates that, moving from a situation with no fiscal rules
to one in which fiscal rules apply only above 5000, made municipalities just
above the threshold less attractive for skilled people, compared to those just
below the threshold. Finally, columns (3)-(4) of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 further re-
inforce the previous results, as the estimated coefficients obtained within the
smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250] are bigger, compared to those obtained
with the optimal bandwidth 15.
The results of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 are confirmed by the graphical evidence
15This is a typical feature of Regression Discontinuity Design, which is characterized by
a trade-off between bias and efficiency in the estimation of the coefficients. Restricting the
bandwidth around the threshold decreases the bias in the estimated coefficients. This has
an efficiency cost due to the reduction in the number of observations.
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described by Figure 1.5. In the two top graphs of Figure 1.5, we find the
Diff-in-Disc estimates for the sample of mayors, while in the bottom graphs
we find the Diff-in-Disc estimates for the entire pool of politicians. In partic-
ular, Figure 1.5 reports the scatters and second order polynomial fits for the
difference in the values of the dependent variables between all the post-2001
electoral terms and all the pre-2001 electoral terms. As we can see, moving
from the left (municipalities below 5000) to the right (municipalities above)
of the 5000 threshold there is a clear discontinuity in the change in the politi-
cians’ level of education due to the fact that fiscal rules, starting from 2001,
applied only above 5000.
Table 1.6 reports the results obtained estimating equation 1.1 using the
reduced sample of electoral terms between 1999 and 2005. As noted above,
this allows implementation of a clean empirical exercise in which, for the elec-
toral years before 2001, fiscal rules applied to all municipalities, while after
2001 fiscal rules were removed for those below 5000. In this way, it is pos-
sible to interpret the coefficient of the main variable of interest (Relaxation
FR)*(< 5000) as the change in the politicians’ level of education in mu-
nicipalities just below 5000, if compared to those just above, following the
transition from a world in which fiscal rules apply to all municipalities (years
1999-2000) to a world in which fiscal rules are removed for those below the
5000 threshold. Panel A of Table 1.6 reports the results relative to the level
of education of mayors, while Panel B makes reference to the level of edu-
cation of all municipal politicians. The results obtained using the optimal
bandwidth are reported in columns (1) and (3), while in columns (2) and (4)
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we can find the smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250]. As we can see, the
results in Table 1.6 go in the same identical direction as those in Tables 1.4
and 1.5.
1.5.4 The role of past deficits
As reported in Subsection 1.5.1, in the main sample of interest all the munic-
ipal characteristics are balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after
2001, except the variable past deficit (see Panel B of Table A.2). This vari-
able represents the deficit per capita that a specific mayor inherits from her
predecessor 16, and, as we can see, the removal of fiscal rules has a positive ef-
fect on it. This is not a surprising result. In fact, Grembi et al. (2016), using
yearly data on Italian municipalities and the same reform exploited in this
chapter, have already shown that fiscal rules have been effective in reducing
the deficit per capita in Italian municipalities.
The imbalance in the variable past deficit represents a potential threat
to the identification strategy used in this chapter, because starting from 2001
different levels of deficit below and above the threshold may have a direct
effect on the selection of politicians. Thus, past deficit represents a potential
confounding factor of the effect of fiscal rules on political selection. The first
goal of this section is to deal directly with this potential threat, trying to
demonstrate that in reality the differential levels of deficit below and above
16As already said in Subsection 1.5.1, this is the average level of deficit per capita at the
moment in which new elections are held, which is when new politicians and new mayors
may be selected. For example, for a municipality that voted in 1999 before the relaxation
of fiscal rules and then in 2004 after the reform, past deficit in 2004 is measured as the
average deficit over the years 1999-2003.
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the 5000 threshold after 2001 are not an issue. The second goal of this
section is to develop a heterogenity mechanisms analysis, to determine which
municipalities are driving the main results.
To develop the empirical exercises reported in this subsection, I imported
information about the balance sheets of all Italian municipalities. In partic-
ular, as described in Section 1.3, I collected data on the balance sheets of
all Italian municipalities for the years from 2000 to 2012. Because I do not
have data on the balance sheets of Italian municipalities for the years before
2000, I have limited the exercises in this subsection to just one electoral year
before the removal of fiscal rules. For reasons of symmetry, I am also keeping
just one electoral year after the relaxation of fiscal rules. Finally, in order
to implement a clean empirical exericise in which all the municipalities are
constrained by fiscal rules in the electoral years immediately before the 2001
relaxation, I have developed the analysis in this subsection using the sample
of electoral terms from 1999 to 2005 (i.e. the one already used in Table 1.6)
17.
As already said, the first goal of this section is to show that the unbalance
in the variable past deficit is not an issue for the empirical analysis developed
in the chapter. This is pursued in two ways: 1) first of all, I exploit one
result of Grembi et al. (2016), who have shown that, among the mayors
not constrained by fiscal rules, those who are term limited (i.e. second term
mayor who cannot re-run for re-election) do not run higher deficits compared
to mayors constrained by fiscal rules. Following this result, I implement an
17I get very similar results if I use the entire sample of electoral terms from 1993 to 2012
(i.e. the sample used in Tables 1.4 and 1.5).
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empirical exercise in which I keep only the municipalities that have a term-
limited mayor in the electoral term immediately before the 2001 relaxation;
2) I directly control for the variable past deficit in the regression analysis,
interacting it with all the Diff-in-Disc model. The results of the first exericse
are reported in Table 1.7, while those of the second are shown in Table 1.8.
Starting with the first exercise, the idea is to exploit a result reported
by Grembi et al. (2016), who have found that term limited mayors not
constrained by fiscal rules do not generally run higher deficit compared to
mayors constrained by fiscal rules. Thus, keeping only municipalities that
have a term-limited mayor in the electoral term immediately before the 2001
relaxation, I should find that, at the time of the first election immediately
after the 2001 removal of fiscal rules, municipalities just below and just above
the 5000 threshold should not be characterized by different levels of past
deficit. In fact, as described by the Appendix Table A.3, this does not seem
to be the case. In practice, in Table A.3, I am repeating the balance tests
described in Subsection 1.5.1 using only the sample of municipalities that
have a term-limited mayor in the electoral term immediately before the 2001
relaxation. As we can see from the table in the Appendix, all the municipal
characteristics are balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001,
including past deficit. This is consistent with the result reported by Grembi
et al. (2016).
Thus, exploiting the fact that, in this subsample, municipalities around
the 5000 threshold are not characterized by differential levels of past deficit
after the removal of fiscal rules, I apply the Diff-in-Disc model to this sub-
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sample. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 1.7. As we can see,
all the estimated coefficients go in the same direction and largely confirm the
results already observed in Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. In particular, the results
in Panel B of Table 1.7 confirm the corresponding results in Panel B of Table
1.6, both in terms of direction and magnitude 18. The estimated coefficients
in Panel A confirm the corresponding coefficients in Table 1.6 in terms of
direction, while they are bigger in terms of magnitude. This is probably due
to the fact that the municipalities used in this exercise, which have a term-
limited mayor in the electoral term immediately before the 2001 relaxation,
are those forced by the term limit rule to elect a new mayor in the first elec-
tion immediately after the 2001 relaxation. Thus, these municipalities are
characterized by a much higher turnover of mayors if compared to the entire
sample of towns used in Subsection 1.5.3. In conclusion, the results of Ta-
ble 1.7 seem to indicate that the differential levels of past deficit after the
removal of fiscal rules are not driving the main results found in Subsection
1.5.3. Thus, the imbalance in the variable past deficit does not appear to
undermine the empirical strategy used in this chapter.
To further reinforce the robustness check described in Table 1.7, in Table
1.8 I report the results of the empirical exercise implemented interacting the
Diff-in-Disc model with the variable past deficit. Notice that this variable,
which is measured before the first election held immediately after the 2001
18The fact that the coefficient in Panel B, column (3) is not statistically significant seems
to be for reasons of efficiency. In fact, in implementing this exercise I am left with a very
small number of observations. It is reassuring that the magnitude of this coefficient is very
similar to the magnitude of the corresponding coefficient in Panel B, column (3) of Table
1.6.
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relaxation, can be considered as a pre-treatment covariate with respect to my
main variable of interest (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 19. For this reason, past
deficit should not represent a bad control, as in theory, being measured before
the switch from zero to one for the main variable (RelaxationFR)*(< 5000),
it cannot be considered a proper outcome for the main variable of interest
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000).
In Table 1.8, I report the coefficients of both (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000)
and (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) interacted with past deficit. Panel A reports
the results relative to the level of education of mayors, while Panel B refers to
the level of education of all municipal politicians. The results obtained using
the optimal bandwidth are reported in columns (1) and (3), while in columns
(2) and (4) we can find the smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250]. As we
can see, all the estimated coefficients of the variable of interest (Relaxation
FR)*(< 5000) are robust to the introduction of the interaction term between
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) and past deficit. Thus, even controlling for the
imbalance in past deficit, the results of the Diff-in-Disc model continue to
indicate that the imposition of fiscal rules made towns just below the 5000
threshold more attractive for skilled people, compared to municipalities just
above the threshold.
An interesting pattern emerges from Table 1.8: all the estimated coeffi-
cients of the interaction term between (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) and past
19For example, for a municipality that voted in 1999 before the relaxation of fiscal rules
and then in 2004 after the reform, past deficit in 2004 is measured as the average deficit
over the years 1999-2003. Unfortunately, given the temporal limitation in the balance
sheets data at my disposal, in building past deficit, I had to use contemporaneous values
for the electoral terms immediately before the 2001 removal of fiscal rules (i.e. electoral
terms 1999-2000).
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deficit are negative, and most of them are statistically different from zero.
This brings us to the second goal of this subsection, which is try to imple-
ment a heterogeneity mechanisms analysis, to reveal which municipalities are
driving the main results of the chapter. This is done in both Table 1.8 and
1.9. These heterogeneity mechanism exercises refer to the subsample of may-
ors only. This is because mayors, who represent the main central figure in
the municipal administration in Italy, are probably those who are more at-
tracted by the flexibility and discretion allowed by the absence of fiscal rules.
Thus, it is possible to think that, among the towns not constrained by fiscal
rules, these flexibility and discretion may be reduced in municipalities already
characterized by high levels of past deficit. This should primarly affect the
selection of mayors, who probably benefit more from the absence of fiscal
rules.
Starting from Table 1.8, the negative coefficients of the interaction term
between (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) and past deficit seem to indicate that
the main results are driven by municipalities recording low deficits in the term
immediately before the 2001 removal of fiscal rules. This is because every unit
increase in past deficit reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of
the variable of interest (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000). To reinforce this result,
in Table 1.9 I implement two exercises: 1) I interact the Diff-in-Disc model
with a dummy variable equal to one for municipalities with a value of past
deficit above the median. The results are in Panel A, where I report the
estimated coefficients of (Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) for the subsamples of
municipalities with past deficit below the median and of towns with past
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deficit above the median. I also report the coefficient of the difference be-
tween the two subsamples; 2) in Panel B I repeat the same exercise using a
dummy variable equal to one for municipalities that were running a deficit in
the term immediately before the 2001 relaxation, to compare them to towns
that were running a surplus.
The results in Table 1.9 go in the same direction as those reported in
Table 1.8: the main results of the chapter seem to be driven by municipalities
with a low level of deficit (if not a surplus) in the term immediately before
the first election after the removal of fiscal rules. In fact, the coefficients of
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) reported in Table 1.9 are significant in magnitude
and statistically different from zero only for municipalities with a low past
deficit or towns with a past surplus. Besides that, the coefficients of the dif-
ference between the two subsamples are big in magnitude and almost always
statistically different from zero in both Panel A and B.
Hence, the results of this heterogeneity analysis suggest that the imposi-
tion of fiscal rules above the 5000 threshold only made those towns just below
5000 with low levels of past deficit more attractive for skilled people. This
is consistent with the idea that competent individuals want to enter politics
if they are given enough power, discretion and flexibility. This is probably
not the case for municipalities that are not constrained by fiscal rules, but
do have high levels of past deficit. In fact, skilled individuals, who are prob-
ably only attracted to politics if they are free to manage budget outcomes,
may not be interested in a mayoral position whose power and discretion are
burdened by high deficits and accumulated debt. This is consistent with the
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idea that skilled individuals enter politics in the pursuit of a political career,
which is more difficult if the role is constrained by fiscal rules or high levels of
past deficit. Below I study how individuals characterized by different levels
of skill and education (i.e. graduate mayors vs. non-graduate mayors) affect
budget outcomes and pursue political careers in a different way.
1.5.5 The effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians: other characteristics
In this subsection, I briefly describe results from running the Diff-in-Disc
model using other individual characteristics of the mayors as dependent vari-
ables. I report the estimated coefficients of the variable of interest (Relaxation
FR)*(< 5000) in Table 1.10. I used the entire sample of electoral terms from
1993 to 2012. Panel A of Table 1.10 contains the estimated coefficients for
the age and the gender of mayors. Panel B shows the estimated coefficients
for a dummy variable equal to one for unemployed mayors and for the total
years of past political experience of the mayors 20. The results obtained using
the optimal bandwidth are reported in columns (1) and (3), while in columns
(2) and (4) we can find the smaller bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250].
As we can see from Table 1.10, other characteristics of the mayors are not
affected by the imposition of fiscal rules in municipalities just above the 5000
threshold, compared to those just below. The only exception is represented by
20The past political experience of the mayors has been built looking at all past political
positions occupied by the mayors at any level of politics. In Italy there are five levels of
government: municipalities, provinces, regions, the national parliament and the European
parliament.
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the age of mayors, which yields a negative and large coefficient which is statis-
tically different from zero in the smaller range specification h ∈ [−250,+250].
This suggests that the more competent and skilled individuals who are at-
tracted by the absence of fiscal rules in municipalities just below 5000, may
be also relatively younger. This is consistent with the idea that skilled in-
dividuals are probably attracted by the discretion and power offered by the
absence of fiscal rules because they want to pursue a political career. In fact,
as shown by Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016), young politicians are more
likely to be elected at higher levels of government after their first experience
as mayors. Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016) also show that young politi-
cians tend to manipulate budget outcomes in order to pursue their political
career goals. Below I discuss how individuals characterized by different levels
of skills and education (i.e. graduate mayors vs. non-graduate mayors) affect
budget outcomes and pursue political career goals in a different way.
1.5.6 Validity tests
As previously mentioned, to be valid the identification strategy requires three
main assumptions: 1) there must not be manipulative sorting of the running
variable Rit around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001, such that mu-
nicipalities must not be able to self-select themselves and decide which side of
the cut-off to stay on; 2) other potential outcomes and municipal character-
istics must be balanced around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001 and
3) municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold must be on
parallel trends prior to the removal of the fiscal rules in 2001. In particular, as
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indicated by Grembi et al. (2016), there must be no interaction between fiscal
rules and the confounding policy, which is the differential wage paid across
the 5000 threshold. As I have already dealt with assumption 2 in Subsection
1.5.1, in this subsection I address assumptions 1 and 3, with the goal to show
that they hold in the data used in this chapter.
In Figure 1.7, I present scatters and 3rd-order polynomial estimates for
Assumption 1 to test the null hypothesis of the continuity of the density of the
population around the 5000 threshold. This test is applied to both 1991 and
2001 census populations, which are the two different measures of population
used in the empirical analysis. In the top two graphs of Figure 1.7, there
is no evidence of discontinuity at the 5000 threshold. To ensure that there
has not been sorting over time, with the municipality trying to manipulate
population numbers between the 1991 Census and the 2001 one, in Figure
1.7 I also test the continuity of the difference between the density of the 2001
census population and the density of the 1991 census population. As we can
observe in the bottom graph, there is no evidence of sorting or discontinuity.
These results are consistent with those of Grembi et al. (2016).
Results of testing Assumption 3 are in the Appendix Table A.1, in which
I apply the Diff-in-Disc model to pre-treatment data (i.e. pre-2001 data)
that go from 1993 to 2000. This exercise uses two electoral terms for each
municipality: one electoral term before 1999 and one electoral year starting
from 1999 or 2000. The main variable of interest is the interaction term
(Introduction FR)*(< 5, 000), which is equal to one for municipalities below
5000 for the electoral terms starting from 1999. This exercise: 1) shows
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that municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold were on
parallel trends in the periods before the removal of the fiscal rules in 2001; 2)
demonstrates that municipalities just below and just above the 5000 threshold
did not react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999. This last
assumption is required in order to show that over time there has not been any
interaction between fiscal rules and the wage increase at the 5000 threshold
(i.e. the two policies that change at the 5000 threshold).
As already discussed, if assumption 3 was valid, this falsification test
should deliver a zero effect. In fact, as we can see from Table A.1, this is
the case. The coefficients reported in Table A.1 are not statistically different
from zero. These results provide evidence that municipalities just below and
just above the 5000 threshold were on parallel trends in the periods before
the removal of the fiscal rules in 2001 and that low-wage and high-wage towns
did not react differently to the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999.
The results of Table A.1 are confirmed by the graphs Figure 1.6, in which I
am reporting yearly Regression Discontinuity Design estimates of the effect of
being below the 5000 threshold on the selection of politicians. The estimates
reported are obtained using the bandwidth h ∈ [−250,+250] for all the years
of the sample. The red vertical line represents the introduction of fiscal
rules in 1999, which applied to all municipalities. The green vertical line
represents the relaxation of fiscal rules in 2001 for municipalities below the
5000 threshold. As in the previous subsection, the main focus is on the level
of education of politicians.
As we can see from Figure 1.6, in the years before 2001, municipalities
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just below and just above the 5000 threshold showed parallel trends. In
particular, for the period before the 2001 relaxation, it is not possible to ob-
serve in the data any significant change in the types of politicians selected by
municipalities below 5000, compared to those above the threshold. Besides
that, consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), mu-
nicipalities below 5000, in the year before 2001, were selecting less competent
individuals. As explained by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), this was due
to the lower wage paid to the mayor and the executive officers. As described
by Figure 1.6, this pattern in the selection of politicians changes starting
from 2001, when fiscal rules were applied only to municipalities above the
5000 threshold. In fact, the evidence provided by the yearly RDD estimates
seem to indicate that the imposition of fiscal rules, which reduced the power
and the discretion of municipal governments, apparently cancelled the pos-
itive effect of the wage increase on the level of education of politicians. As
mentioned previously, the big changes in 2004 can be explained by the fact
that this year represents the first biggest municipal election after the 2001
relaxation, in which more than half of the municipalities voted. In conclu-
sion, the evidence provided by Figure 1.6 is an indication that, while paying
politicians high wages may be a good idea, as more skilled individuals are
attracted by high remuneration, competent persons may decide to enter pol-
itics for other reasons: Figure 1.6 suggests that reducing the power and the
discretion of politicians may have a negative effect on the selection of skilled
individuals.
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1.6 Conclusion
This Chapter investigates the effect of fiscal rules on the selection of politi-
cians. Using data on Italian municipalities, it shows: 1) the imposition of
fiscal rules negatively affects the quality of the political class; 2) the effect
is driven by municipalities with low levels of deficit; 3) fiscal rules offset the
positive selection effect determined by the wage increase that operates at the
5000 threshold.
This Chapter uses a dataset that contains information on Italian munici-
palities for the period 1993-2012. Italian municipalities provide an interesting
framework for the study of fiscal rules: in 1999 the Italian central government
introduced fiscal rules for all Italian municipalities. The rules were then re-
moved in 2001 for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants.
Exploiting this institutional setting and implementing aDiff-in-Disc model,
I show that fiscal rules have a negative effect on the level of education of politi-
cians. In particular, following the 2001 removal of fiscal rules, the percentage
of graduate municipal politicians rose by around 12 % points in municipalities
just below the threshold, compared to those still constrained by fiscal rules
after 2001. At the same time, politicians’ average years of education increased
by 0.64 years (i.e. approximately 7.68 months). Besides that, following the
2001 reform, the percentage of graduate mayors rose by approximately 27.2
% points in municipalities exempt by fiscal rules. This implies an increase in
mayors’ average years of education of about 1.5 years.
Two important features of these results are: 1) the increase in politicians’
education level in municipalities just below 5000 is consistent with a general
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rising trend in the level of education in both the Italian population and the
entire sample of municipal politicians. Fiscal rules offset this increasing trend
only in municipalities just above 5000 inhabitants, while in those just below
the level of education could continue to grow; 2) while before 2001 munic-
ipalities just above the threshold were selecting more educated politicians,
this difference disappeared after the 2001 reform. This suggests that fiscal
rules offset the positive effect of the wage increase on the level of education
of politicians.
I also show that the results are robust to the following tests: first, I show
that the results are not driven by the imbalance in the levels of deficit around
the 5000 threshold before and after 2001. On the contrary, the main results
are driven by municipalities with low levels of deficit. This is consistent with
the idea that competent individuals enter politics if they are given sufficient
discretion and power. This may not be the case in those municipalities not
constrained by fiscal rules, but burdened by high deficits.
Second, a falsification test, which uses pre-2001 data, shows that munic-
ipalities just below and just above the threshold did not react differently to
the introduction of fiscal rules. I then provide evidence that municipal ob-
servable characteristics are balanced around the 5000 cutoff before and after
2001. Finally, I show that there is no evidence of manipulative sorting of
population numbers around the 5000 threshold before and after 2001.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that, while
high wages for politicians may be a good idea as better remuneration attracts
more educated persons, competent individuals enter politics for different rea-
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sons: the results in this chapter indicates that fiscal rules, reducing the power
and discretion of a government, may have a negative effect on the selection
of politicians.
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Table 1.1: Fiscal rules in Italy: the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP)
Year Target Limits Reference Covered
on target Year municipalities
1999 Budget Balance growth: 0 % 1997 All
2000 Budget Balance growth: 0 % 1998 All
2001 Budget Balance growth: max 3 % 1999 > 5000
2002 Budget Balance growth: max 2.5 % 2000 > 5000
Current Expenditures growth: max 6 % 2000
2003 Budget Balance growth: 0 % 2001 > 5000
2004 Budget Balance growth: max 1.7 % 2003 > 5000
2005 Total Expenditures growth: 10 %/11.5 % 2002-2004 > 5000
2006 Current Expenditures cut: -6.5 %/-8 % 2004 > 5000
Capital Expenditures growth: max 8.1 % 2004
2007 Budget Balance cut: 0 %/-8 % 2003-2005 > 5000
2008 Budget Balance cut: 0 %/-8 % 2003-2005 > 5000
2009 Budget Balance cut: 0 %/-70 % 2007 > 5000
2010 Budget Balance cut: 0 %/-110 % 2007 > 5000
Notes. Domestic Stability Pact: fiscal rules decided by the Italian central government
which apply year by year to the covered municipalities. Columns definition: Target =
target decided by the central government for a specific year; Limits on target = these
are the limits on the target that the municipal government must apply. Growth sets
a cap for the increase of the target in a specific year with respect to the the reference
year. Cut indicates that the municipal government must cut the target by that amount
in that specific year with respect to the the reference year. When, in a specific year,
there are two limits on target it means that these apply differentially depending on the
past fiscal performance of a municipality (i.e. one limit applies to virtuous municipalities,
while the other applies to undisciplined towns); Covered municipalities = this indicates
the municipalities that must apply the fiscal rules. Legislative sources: annual national
budget law (Legge Finanziaria) from 1999 to 2010. Other sources: Grembi et al. (2016);
Chiades and Mengotto (2013); Revelli (2013).
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Table 1.2: Legislative population thresholds in Italy:
Municipalities below 15,000
Population Wage Wage Size Size
Mayor Ministers Government Council
< 1000 1,291 15 % 4 12
1000-3000 1,446 20 % 4 12
3000-5000 2,169 20 % 4 16
5000-10,000 2,789 50 % 4 16
10,000-15000 3,099 55 % 6 20
Notes. Legislative population thresholds that apply to Italian municipalities with
less than 15000 inhabitants. Columns definition: Population = municipal popu-
lation as measured by the last Census; Wage Mayor = it is the wage paid to the
mayor, expressed in Euros at 2000 prices; Wage Ministers = wage paid to the minis-
ters as a percentage of the wage of the mayor; Size Government = maximum numer
of ministers that can be appointed in the municipal government; Size Council =
numer of seats in the municipal council. All the wage thresholds date back to 1960,
except the 1000 and 10,000 thresholds, which were introduced in 2000. Sources:
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013); Grembi et al. (2016).
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics:
Municipalities below 5000 vs. Municipalities above 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Below obs Above obs p-value
5000 5000
Politicians characteristics
Graduate Mayor 0.479 3896 0.502 2031 0.096
Years education Mayor 14.998 3896 15.1118 2031 0.204
Proportion graduate all politicians 0.278 3896 0.326 2031 0.000
Average Years education all politicians 13.091 3896 13.544 2031 0.000
Age Mayor 47.974 3869 48.047 2019 0.777
Female Mayor 0.076 3896 0.098 2031 0.002
Unemployed Mayor 0.152 3880 0.136 2020 0.112
Political experience Mayor 6.511 3896 6.498 2031 0.929
Municipal characteristics
longitude 11.974 3896 12.239 2031 0.000
latitude 43.507 3896 43.421 2031 0.176
altitude 289.990 3896 220.068 2031 0.000
area 35.533 3896 37.288 2031 0.082
South 0.293 3896 0.322 2031 0.024
Centre 0.158 3896 0.138 2031 0.041
North-West 0.351 3896 0.309 2031 0.001
North East 0.195 3896 0.229 2031 0.002
Past Deficit 20.311 3896 13.974 2031 0.000
Income per capita 13523 3896 13501 2031 0.778
% foreign 0.072 3896 0.076 2031 0.003
Population density 295.435 3896 459.197 2031 0.000
% 65 0.192 3896 0.1798 2031 0.000
% 15-64 0.665 3896 0.673 2031 0.000
% 0-18 0.184 3896 0.189 2031 0.000
Education municipal population
% college 0.075 3896 0.078 2031 0.000
% high secondary 0.287 3896 0.290 2031 0.000
% low secondary 0.314 3896 0.314 2031 0.819
% primary 0.223 3896 0.217 2031 0.000
% illiterate 0.013 3896 0.012 2031 0.000
Notes. Municipalities between 3000 and 7000. Electoral terms between 1993 and 2012.
Below 5000 = 1 for municipalities between 3000 and 5000 inhabitants. Above 5000 = 1 for
municipalities between 5000 and 7000 inhabitants. Columns (1) and (3) report the mean
values for the two samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value is the p-value of the
difference between the means of the two samples.
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Table 1.4: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of Mayors:
Electoral years 1993-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mayors with university degree
Optimal bandwidth CCT CCT No No
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.272** 0.247** 0.495*** 0.452**
(0.114) (0.119) (0.174) (0.181)
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) -0.068 -0.130
(0.113) (0.160)
Bandwidth 609.3 609.3 250 250
Observations 1,758 1,758 747 747
Panel B: Years of education Mayors
Optimal bandwidth CCT CCT No No
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 1.485* 1.404* 2.957** 2.783**
(0.765) (0.791) (1.181) (1.209)
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) -0.190 -0.450
(0.804) (1.128)
Bandwidth 606.0 606.0 250 250
Observations 1,744 1,744 747 747
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Munic-
ipalities between 3000 and 7000. Electoral terms between 1993 and 2012. Treatment variables:
(Introduction FR) is a dummy variable =1 for the electoral years 1999-2000, during which
fiscal rules applied to all municipalities. (Relaxation FR) is a dummy variable =1 for all elec-
toral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities <5000.
(< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. The outcome variable
in Panel A is a dummy variable =1 for mayors with a university degree. The outcome variable
in Panel B is years of education of mayors. The bandwidth in columns (1)-(2) is calculated
using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. The
bandwidth in column (3)-(4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.5: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of all politicians:
Electoral years 1993-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Proportion all politicians with a university degree
Optimal bandwidth CCT CCT No No
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.119*** 0.117** 0.141*** 0.123**
(0.045) (0.050) (0.052) (0.058)
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) -0.007 -0.061
(0.049) (0.054)
Bandwidth 326.8 326.8 250 250
Observations 1000 1000 747 747
Panel B: Average years of education all politicians
Optimal bandwidth CCT CCT No No
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.640* 0.648* 0.987** 0.908**
(0.335) (0.363) (0.457) (0.496)
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) 0.040 -0.250
(0.321) (0.410)
Bandwidth 476.2 476.2 250 250
Observations 1,405 1,405 747 747
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Munic-
ipalities between 3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1993 and 2012. Treatment variables:
(Introduction FR) is a dummy variable =1 for the electoral years 1999-2000, during which
fiscal rules applied to all municipalities. (Relaxation FR) is a dummy variable =1 for all elec-
toral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities <5000.
(< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. The outcome variable
in Panel A is the proportion of all municipal politicians with a university degree. The outcome
variable in Panel B is average years of education of all municipal politicians. The bandwidth in
columns (1)-(2) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal
bandwidth h selector. The bandwidth in column (3)-(4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.6: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians:
Electoral years starting from 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Level of Education of mayors
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.434** 0.648** 1.918* 3.529**
(0.174) (0.257) (1.110) (1.741)
Bandwidth 592.1 250 629.1 250
Observations 540 235 578 235
Panel B: Average level of education of all politicians
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Proportion university degree Average years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.081* 0.189*** 0.751** 1.342**
(0.046) (0.066) (0.381) (0.593)
Bandwidth 583.2 250 632 250
Observations 531 235 694.7 235
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Municipalities between
3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1999 and 2005. Estimates obtained working with 2 electoral years for each
municipality: 1 electoral year before 2001 and 1 electoral year starting from 2001. Treatment variables: (Relaxation
FR) is a dummy variable =1 for all electoral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for
municipalities <5000. (< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. The outcome variables
in Panel A measure the level of education of mayors. The outcome variables in Panel B measure the level of education
of all municipal politicians. The bandwidth in columns (1) and (3) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. The bandwidth in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by
*, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.7: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians:
Electoral years starting from 1999;
Term limited mayors before the reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Level of Education of mayors
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.749*** 0.753** 4.689*** 4.844**
(0.250) (0.352) (1.545) (2.435)
Bandwidth 549.6 250 632.4 250
Observations 285 138 325 138
Panel B: Average level of education of all politicians
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Proportion university degree Average years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.125* 0.145* 0.687 1.711**
(0.071) (0.084) (0.589) (0.802)
Bandwidth 339.3 250 490.4 250
Observations 190 138 260 138
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Municipalities between
3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1999 and 2005. Estimates obtained working with 2 electoral years for each
municipality: 1 electoral year before 2001 and 1 electoral year starting from 2001. Regressions run using the sub-
sample in which all the mayors cannot be re-elected after the electoral mandate just before the 2001 relaxation of
fiscal rules (i.e. all mayors before the reform are term limited). Treatment variables: (Relaxation FR) is a dummy
variable =1 for all electoral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities <5000.
(< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. The outcome variables in Panel A measure
the level of education of mayors. The outcome variables in Panel B measure the level of education of all municipal
politicians. The bandwidth in columns (1) and (3) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a,
2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. The bandwidth in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.8: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians:
Electoral years starting from 1999;
Interaction with Past Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Level of Education of mayors
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.628*** 1.155*** 3.326*** 6.708***
(0.193) (0.262) (1.190) (1.790)
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000)*(Past Deficit) -0.009* -0.023*** -0.067** -0.141***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.028) (0.038)
Bandwidth 592.1 250 629.1 250
Observations 540 235 578 235
Panel B: Average level of education of all politicians
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Proportion university degree Average years of education
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.101* 0.311*** 0.818* 2.382***
(0.053) (0.075) (0.416) (0.652)
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000)*(Past Deficit) -0.001 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.044***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015)
Bandwidth 583.2 250 694.7 250
Observations 531 235 632 235
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Municipalities between
3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1999 and 2005. Estimates obtained working with 2 electoral years for
each municipality: 1 electoral year before 2001 and 1 electoral year starting from 2001. Treatment variables: (Past
Deficit) is the municipal average deficit measured in the electoral mandate before the removal of fiscal rules in 2001
for municipalities<5000. (Relaxation FR) is a dummy variable =1 for all electoral years starting from 2001, after
which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities <5000. (< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000
inhabitants. The outcome variables in Panel A measure the level of education of mayors. The outcome variables
in Panel B measure the level of education of all municipal politicians. The bandwidth in columns (1) and (3) is
calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. The bandwidth
in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.9: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians:
Electoral years starting from 1999;
Low vs high past deficit municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Low vs. High past deficit
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education mayor
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.787*** 1.325*** 4.172*** 8.119***
(Past Deficit <median) (0.234) (0.334) (1.410) (2.092)
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.214 0.242 0.287 0.549
(Past Deficit >=median) (0.256) (0.359) (1.677) (2.473)
Difference -0.573* -1.082** -3.884* -7.570**
(0.346) (0.490) (2.191) (3.239)
Bandwidth 592.1 250 629.1 250
Observations 540 235 578 235
Panel B: Past surplus vs. Past deficit
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education mayor
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.943*** 2.009*** 5.021*** 10.915***
(Municipalities with past surplus) (0.343) (0.360) (1.770) (2.106)
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) 0.334* 0.420 1.433 2.252
(Municipalities with past deficit) (0.198) (0.296) (1.305) (2.059)
Difference -0.609 -1.589*** -3.587 -8.663***
(0.397) (0.466) (2.199) (2.946)
Bandwidth 540 250 629.1 250
Observations 592.1 235 578 235
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Municipalities
between 3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1999 and 2005. Estimates obtained working with 2
electoral years for each municipality: 1 electoral year before 2001 and 1 electoral year starting from 2001.
Treatment variables: (Past Deficit) is the municipal average deficit measured in the electoral mandate
before the removal of fiscal rules in 2001 for municipalities< 5000. (Relaxation FR) is a dummy variable
=1 for all electoral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for municipalities <5000.
(< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. Panel A compares municipalities
with a value of (Past Deficit)<median with those with a value of (Past Deficit)>=median. Panel B
compares municipalities with a value of (Past Deficit)<=0 with those with a value of (Past Deficit)>0.
The outcome variables in both Panel A and B are: (a) a dummy variable =1 for mayors with a university
degree in columns (1)-(2); (b) years of education of mayors in columns(3)-(4). The bandwidth in columns
(1) and (3) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth
h selector. The bandwidth in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 1.10: Effect of fiscal rules on other characteristics of mayors:
Electoral years 1993-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Age and gender of mayor
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Age of mayor Female mayor
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) -1.597 -5.764* 0.047 0.067
(2.302) (3.435) (0.075) (0.087)
Bandwidth 520.7 250 395.9 250
Observations 1,532 743 1,178 747
Panel B: Employment status and past political experience
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Unemployed mayor Political experience mayor
(Relaxation FR)*(< 5000) -0.015 -0.148 1.674 1.667
(0.093) (0.121) (1.238) (1.753)
Bandwidth 408.6 250 492.3 250
Observations 1,213 741 1,466 747
Notes. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Municipalities
between 3000 and 7000. Electoral years between 1993 and 2012. Treatment variables: (Relaxation FR)
is a dummy variable =1 for all electoral years starting from 2001, after which fiscal rules were removed for
municipalities <5000. (< 5000) is a dummy variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. Outcome
variables in Panel A: (a) age of the mayor in columns (1)-(2); (b) dummy variable =1 for female mayor in
columns (3)-(4). Outcome variables in Panel B: (a) dummy variable =1 for unemployed mayor in columns
(1)-(2); (b) years of past political experience of the mayor at all levels of politics in columns (3)-(4). The
bandwidth in columns (1) and (3) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b)
optimal bandwidth h selector. The bandwidth in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at
the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage Italian population with a college degree
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Notes. Percentage of adult Italian population aged >=18 years old with a college degree. Years from 1993
to 2009. Source: Italian Statistical Office (Istat).
84
Figure 1.2: Level of education of municipal politicians, all municipalities
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Notes. All Italian municipalities. Years between 1995 and 2012. Top graphs: (1) Evolution over time of
the average years of education of the mayors of all Italian municipalities; (2) evolution over time of the
proportion of mayors with a university degree. Bottom graphs: (1) Evolution over time of the average years
of education of all municipal politicians elected in all Italian municipalities; (2) evolution over time of the
proportion of all municipal politicians with a university degree.
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Figure 1.3: Level of education of municipal politicians, municipalities between
3000-7000
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Notes. Italian municipalities between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants. Years between 1995 and 2012. The
blue lines capture the behaviour of municipalities between 5000-7000 inhabitants. The red lines capture the
behaviour of municipalities between 3000-5000 inhabitants. The red vertical lines represents the introduction
of fiscal rules in 1999, which applied to all municipalities. The green vertical lines represents the relaxation
of fiscal rules in 2001 for municipalities below the 5000 threshold. Top graphs: (1) Evolution over time of
the average years of education of the mayors of Italian municipalities between 3000-7000 inhabitants; (2)
evolution over time of the proportion of mayors with a university degree. Bottom graphs: (1) Evolution over
time of the average years of education of all municipal politicians elected in Italian municipalities between
3000-7000 inhabitants; (2) evolution over time of the proportion of all municipal politicians with a university
degree.
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Figure 1.4: Level of education of municipal politicians, municipalities between
4,400-5,600
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Notes. Italian municipalities between 4,400 and 5,600 inhabitants. Years between 1995 and 2012. The
blue lines capture the behaviour of municipalities between 5000-5,600 inhabitants. The red lines capture the
behaviour of municipalities between 4,400-5000 inhabitants. The red vertical lines represents the introduction
of fiscal rules in 1999, which applied to all municipalities. The green vertical lines represents the relaxation
of fiscal rules in 2001 for municipalities below the 5000 threshold. Top graphs: (1) Evolution over time of
the average years of education of the mayors of Italian municipalities between 4,400-5,600 inhabitants; (2)
evolution over time of the proportion of mayors with a university degree. Bottom graphs: (1) Evolution
over time of the average years of education of all municipal politicians elected in Italian municipalities
between 4,400-5,600 inhabitants; (2) evolution over time of the proportion of all municipal politicians with
a university degree.
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Figure 1.5: The Effect of Fiscal Rules on the selection of politicians,
difference-in-discontinuity
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Notes. Difference-in-discontinuity estimates. Horizontal axis: normalized population around the 5000 thresh-
old. Vertical axis: difference in the dependent variable of all post-reform elections (i.e. elections starting
from 2001) with all the pre-reform elections (i.e. election before 2001). Scatter points are averaged over bins
of 50 inhabitants. The central blue line represents a split second-order polynomial of the outcome variable
in the normalized population, fitted separately on each side of the threshold.The green lines represent the
95 percent confidence interval. Top graphs: (1) Difference-in-discontinuity estimates for the average years
of education of the mayors; (2) Difference-in-discontinuity estimates for the proportion of mayors with a
university degree. Bottom graphs: (1) Difference-in-discontinuity estimates for the average years of educa-
tion of all municipal politicians; (2) Difference-in-discontinuity estimates for the proportion of all municipal
politicians with a university degree.
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Figure 1.6: The Effect of Fiscal Rules on the selection of politicians, yearly
RDD
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Notes. Yearly evolution of local linear regression RDD estimates. Horizontal axis: years between 1995
and 2012. The red vertical lines represents the introduction of fiscal rules in 1999, which applied to all
municipalities. The green vertical lines represents the relaxation of fiscal rules in 2001 for municipalities
below the 5000 threshold. Vertical axis: RDD estimates of local linear regressions run with bandwidth
h = 250 around the threshold. The central blue lines represent the local linear regression estimates. Each
blue dot represents a local linear regression estimate for a specific year of the sample. The green lines
represent the 95 percent confidence interval. Top graphs: (1) Evolution of RDD estimates over time for the
average years of education of the mayors; (2) Evolution of RDD estimates over time for the proportion of
mayors with a university degree. Bottom graphs: (1) Evolution of RDD estimates over time for the average
years of education of all municipal politicians; (2) Evolution of RDD estimates over time for the proportion
of all municipal politicians with a university degree.
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Figure 1.7: Density test on the running variable
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Appendix
This Appendix provides additional results and robustness checks, which are
also discussed in the paper. In particular:
• Table A.1: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians. Falsifi-
cation test in 1999.
• Table A.2: Balance test on municipal covariates. Electoral years 1993-
2012.
• Table A.3: Balance test on municipal covariates. Electoral years start-
ing from 1999 (Term limited mayors before the reform).
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Table A.1: Effect of fiscal rules on the education of politicians:
Falsification test in 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Level of Education of mayors
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Mayor with university degree Years of education
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) 0.061 0.009 0.743 0.486
(0.090) (0.085) (0.661) (0.705)
Bandwidth 382.9 250 452.6 250
Observations 378 244 422 244
Panel B: Average level of education of all politicians
Optimal bandwidth CCT No CCT No
Dependent variable Proportion university degree Average years of education
(Introduction FR)*(< 5000) -0.027 -0.071 0.378 -0.219
(0.047) (0.044) (0.310) (0.341)
Bandwidth 292.2 250 420 250
Observations 292 244 408 244
Notes. Falsification test in 1999, testing for the presence of a differential reaction to the introduction of fiscal rules
for municipalities <5000 if compared to municipalities >= 5000. Municipalities between 3000 and 7000. Electoral
years between 1993 and 2000. Estimates obtained working with 2 electoral years for each municipality: 1 electoral
year before 1999 and 1 electoral year in 1999 or 2000. Treatment variables: (Introduction FR) is a dummy variable
=1 for the electoral years 1999-2000, during which fiscal rules applied for all municipalities. (< 5000) is a dummy
variable =1 for municipalities < 5000 inhabitants. The outcome variables in Panel A measure the level of education of
mayors. The outcome variables in Panel B measure the level of education of all municipal politicians. The bandwidth
in columns (1) and (3) is calculated using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h
selector. The bandwidth in column (2) and (4) is h = 250. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Chapter 2
Do educated politicians matter for
fiscal outcomes? Evidence from
Italian municipalities
Abstract
Chapter 1 showed that more educated individuals are less likely to enter pol-
itics in institutional contexts that are constrained by fiscal rules. In this
chapter, I investigate the fiscal implications of educated versus non-educated
political leaders. In particular, using data on Italian municipalities, I study
whether graduate mayors, in comparison to non-graduate mayors, affect fiscal
policies in a different way. This is done with two methodologies: 1) Regres-
sion Discontinuity Design, which compares municipalities in which a graduate
mayoral candidate just won with municipalities in which a graduate mayoral
candidate just lost; 2) Propensity-Score Matching on the subsample of close
mixed electoral competitions. The main results show that graduate mayors
run higher deficits, reducing revenues more than expenditures. The effect
is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. There-
fore, this indicates: 1) more educated politicians have stronger preferences
95
for higher deficits. This may explain why they are less likely to enter politics
in institutional contexts constrained by fiscal rules; 2) fiscal rules, besides
directly constraining the deficit (Grembi et al., 2016), indirectly foster fiscal
stability by discouraging the entry of politicians with stronger preferences for
higher deficits.
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I show that the imposition of fiscal rules negatively affects
the quality of the political class, and in particular the level of education of
politicians. This implies that more competent individuals (as measured by
education levels) are less likely to enter politics in places where fiscal rules
apply. At the same time, these results seem to indicate that more educated
individuals prefer to enter politics in institutional environments not affected
by fiscal rules.
The results of Chapter 1 raise questions about whether more educated
politicians, when compared to those less educated, have different preferences
in terms of fiscal policies. Thus, in this chapter, I analyse the fiscal conse-
quences of highly-educated politicians, compared to the low-educated ones.
Using data on Italian municipalities, I study whether mayors with a college
degree affect fiscal policies differently compared to mayors without a degree.
This comparison is implemented by distinguishing between municipalities af-
fected by the application of fiscal rules and those not affected by them.
The main dependent variable used in this chapter to evaluate the fiscal
behaviour of mayors is the average deficit as a fraction of total revenues, as
the deficit is one of the fiscal outcomes which is mainly affected by fiscal
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rules (Grembi et al., 2016). Besides that, I also study the composition of the
deficit, looking at different types of expenditures and revenues.
To implement the empirical analysis described below, I use the same
dataset as in Chapter 1. This is composed of the sample of Italian mu-
nicipalities with a population of between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants for the
electoral terms from 1993 to 2012. As described in Chapter 1, in 1999 the
Italian government introduced a set of fiscal rules, intended to reduce the
incentives to accumulate debt and run deficits. These rules were introduced
under the title of the “Domestic Stability Pact” (DSP) and were binding for all
municipalities. In 2001, to avoid imposing unbearable constraints on small
municipalities, the central government removed the rules for municipalities
with less than 5000 inhabitants. The 5000 threshold applied until 2013, when
the it was reduced to 1000.
Following the results of Chapter 1, I restrict the sample to the mayors
elected under the new institutional framework created by the 2001 relaxation
of fiscal rules. In addition to this, I conduct a separate empirical analysis
of municipalities in the range 3000-5000 (i.e. municipalities not affected by
fiscal rules starting from 2001) and municipalities in the range 5000-7000
(i.e. towns constrained by fiscal rules starting from 2001), to study how the
absence or presence of fiscal rules shapes the behaviour of politicians with
different levels of education.1
1At the same 5000 threshold, another policy changes, as the wage paid to the mayor
is higher in municipalities above the threshold. This may represent an alternative channel
that influences the behaviour of more educated mayors. In fact, differences in terms of
policies between graduate mayors and non-graduate mayors, in municipalities below 5000,
may be due to heterogeneous responses to the lower wage paid, rather than to the ab-
sence of fiscal rules. The same logic could work for municipalities above 5000, which pay
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My overall research design uses two different methods: 1) a Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), which compares municipalities in which a grad-
uate candidate won by a narrow margin with municipalities in which a can-
didate with a college degree just lost; 2) Propensity-Score Matching on the
subsample of close mixed electoral races between graduate and non-graduate
candidates.
The first methodology used is a simple RDD approach which, under cer-
tain assumptions, allows me to address endogeneity issues and to isolate the
causal effect of a mayor with a college degree. However, as described in
Section 2.5, while all the available observable municipal characteristics are
balanced in the RDD analysis, the same is not true for the individual charac-
teristics of mayors. In fact, as described in Section 2.5, mayors with a college
degree, compared to those without, tend to have less political experience,
have a higher probability of coming from high skilled jobs and are more likely
to be female.
This lack of balance in the set of individual covariates raises concerns
about the reliability of my initial RDD estimates (Brollo and Troiano, 2016).
higher wages and are constrained by fiscal rules. However, the results in Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013), who have studied the effect of wage using Italian data for the period
1993-2001 (i.e. a period during which fiscal rules applied in the same way in the two
groups of municipalities), provide evidence that the wage should not represent a confound-
ing factor: 1) the wage increase does not affect the deficit run by municipal governments,
which is the main dependent variable used in this chapter; 2) high-paid mayors spend less
and raise less revenues in comparison to low-paid ones. However, these results are driven
by selection mechanisms rather than incentives (i.e. high-paid mayors are more educated).
Thus, although I cannot completely rule out potential effects coming from this other policy,
it seems reasonable to claim that differences in terms of policies between highly educated
and less educated mayors in municipalities below 5000, compared to the same difference in
those above 5000, can be attributed to incentives determined by the absence/presence of
fiscal rules, rather than by the different wage paid.
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To deal with this issue, I apply two solutions. Firstly, I re-run the base-
line RDD model but include all the available unbalanced mayoral covariates.
While this solution does not allow me to rule out the possibility that other
unobservable characteristics are different between graduate and non-graduate
mayors, finding that RDD estimates are unchanged after controlling for the
unbalanced mayoral covariates does shut down a substantial source of poten-
tial bias.
The second solution follows the approach developed by Keele, Titiunik and
Zubizarreta (2015) and Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016). Specifically,
I implement a Propensity-Score Matching strategy, which is run using the
subsample of close mixed electoral competitions between graduate mayors
and non-graduate ones. As described in more details in Section 2.4, this
strategy allows me to estimate the average treatment effect of a mayor with
a college degree, while controlling for the individual characteristics of the
mayors. Besides that, as explained by Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016),
running the Propensity-Score Matching model on the sample of close mixed
electoral competitions guarantees that municipal characteristics are balanced
across locations with graduate mayors and those with non-graduate ones.
The main results of the chapter indicate that graduate mayors elected
in municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules tend to run higher deficits
compared to mayors without a college degree. In particular, in municipalities
below 5000, mayors with a college degree tend to run average deficits which
are around 2 % points higher as a fraction of total revenues. These higher
deficits seem to be produced by reducing revenues more than expenditures.
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On the other hand, I could not find any significant difference in terms of fiscal
policies for municipalities constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. municipalities above
5000).
Furthermore, in this chapter I show that graduate mayors seem to be more
career oriented, having a higher probability of being elected at the provincial
level (i.e. the level of government immediately above municipalities)2. It may
be that they run higher deficits to pursue their career goals. The empirical
evidence described in this chapter indicates that more educated politicians
have stronger preferences for higher deficits. This may explain why, as re-
ported in Chapter 1, more educated individuals are less likely to enter politics
in institutional contexts constrained by fiscal rules. This reveals a potential
drawback of fiscal rules, as they could make holding political office less at-
tractive for more educated individuals.
In addition to this, Chapters 1 and 2 indicate that fiscal rules have two
different effects on fiscal policies: 1) a direct effect on fiscal policies, given
that municipalities constrained by fiscal rules run lower deficits (Grembi et
al., 2016); and 2) an indirect effect, as the entry of politicians with stronger
preferences for higher deficits is discouraged by fiscal rules. Thus, fiscal rules,
besides directly constraining the deficit (Grembi et al., 2016), indirectly foster
fiscal stability through the selection of politicians.
In conclusion, Chapters 1 and 2 suggest that fiscal rules have both positive
and negative consequences. On the positive side, they promote stability in
fiscal policies through both incentives and selection. On the negative side,
2In Italy there are five levels of government, which starting from the lower are: munic-
ipalities, provinces, regions and national and European parliaments.
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fiscal rules deter the entry of individuals with a high level of education. These
conclusions create opportunities for future research. In particular, it would
be interesting to integrate and develop this analysis adding data on public
goods production.
This chapter is in general connected to the empirical literature on how
the personal characteristics of politicians affect policies. Among the charac-
teristics analysed we can find: 1) education (Besley et al., 2011); 2) gender
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004 ; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012; Ferreira
and Gyourko 2014; Brollo and Troiano, 2016); 3) age (Alesina, Cassidy and
Troiano, 2016); 4) political orientation (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Ferreira
and Gyourko, 2009); 5) the alignment effect between local and national gov-
ernments (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Bracco et al. 2015) and 6) affiliation to
national parties (Cioffi, Messina and Tommasino, 2012; Galindo-Silva, 2015;
Aragon et al., 2015; Gamalerio, 2016). This chapter contributes to this litera-
ture by analysing the effect of politicians’ education in a specific institutional
framework in which fiscal rules do not apply. The results of this chapter
also raise questions about whether highly educated politicians always benefit
voters, especially when they are also more career oriented.
The closest paper to this is probably Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013),
who, using data on Italian municipalities, have shown that an increase in
the wage paid to politicians may affect fiscal policies through the selection of
more educated individuals. In comparison to their analysis, I study directly
the effect of politicians’ education on both fiscal policies and political career
goals. Besides that, I also show that more educated politicians, if elected in
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an institutional framework not constrained by fiscal rules, tend to run higher
deficits in comparison to less educated ones.
Chapter 2 proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the Italian institu-
tional framework. Section 2.3 describes the data used in this chapter. Section
2.4 lays out the empirical strategy and Section 2.5 discusses the empirical re-
sults and the validity tests. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Setting
In this chapter I use data on Italian municipalities. Italy has approximately
8000 municipalities, and the majority of them are small (around 70 % has
less than 5000 inhabitants). Municipalities manage various services, includ-
ing transport, welfare, environmental services, public utilities and municipal
police. Around 10 % of total public expenditure is managed by municipal
governments, while approximately 20 % of their revenue is generated through
local taxes (transfers from the central government make up the total). The
most important municipal taxes are the property tax and a surcharge on the
personal income tax of residents.
This chapter studies the effect of mayors with a college degree on budget
outcomes. The analysis is developed distinguishing between municipalities
not affected by fiscal rules (i.e. towns in the range 3000-5000) and munici-
palities constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. towns in the interval 5000-7000).
Italian mayors are powerful political agents at the local level as they are
directly elected by the voters and can appoint and dismiss the ministers who
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work with them in the municipal government. The current municipal electoral
law was introduced in 1993 (see Law 81 in 1993), and it prescribes different
rules depending on the dimension of the municipality. In municipalities below
15,000 inhabitants, mayors are elected using a single round plurality rule,
while a two-round system is used above the threshold. Mayors are elected for
a maximum of two consecutive terms (i.e. they face a two-term limit), and a
legislative term lasts for a maximum of 5 years.
Fiscal rules in Italy were introduced in 1999, following the European Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (SGP). These fiscal rules, called the “Domestic Sta-
bility Pact” (DSP), were introduced by the Italian government to establish a
target for deficit reduction for all municipalities. In fact, the DSP has proved
to be effective in reducing the deficits run by municipal governments (see
Grembi et al., 2016). In 2001, the Italian government removed the rules for
municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. This was to avoid constrain-
ing small municipalities, which have fewer economies of scale. This creates
an interesting framework that can be used to compare the fiscal behaviour of
graduate mayors with that of non-graduates.
2.3 Data
This chapter uses a dataset of information about all Italian municipalities
with a population between 3000 and 7000 inhabitants. The data about mu-
nicipal characteristics comes from the Italian Statistical Office (Istat), which
provides information about the following features: 1) education of the mu-
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nicipal population (e.g. fraction of the population with a university degree);
2) geographical characteristics such as area, longitude, latitude and altitude;
3) socio-economic indicators such as income per capita and number of firms;
4) other municipal characteristics such as density, the percentage of migrants
and the average age of the population.
The data on municipal fiscal outcomes come from the Italian Ministry of
Domestic Affairs and cover municipal expenditures and revenues for 2000-
2012.
There is also information about the following characteristics of all munic-
ipal politicians elected between 2001 and 2012: education level, professional
background, past political experience, gender and age. This information has
been collected from the website of the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
In collecting and cleaning the data, I have also reconstructed the political
careers of the mayors, using information from several sources. The informa-
tion about political offices occupied at the local level has been collected from
the website of the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs and the data about
the offices occupied at National and European levels comes from the Italian
and European parliaments3. All of the information has been cross-checked
against information held by the independent association Openpolis4.
3Italian Parliament: http://www.camera.it/ and http://www.senato.it/home. Euro-
pean parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/.
4http://www.openpolis.it/
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
This Chapter uses two different empirical strategies to estimate the effect of
a mayor with a college degree on budget outcomes: the first is Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), while the second is Propensity-Score Matching
in close mixed electoral competitions.
Both strategies are meant to control for the fact that municipalities with
graduate mayors are potentially different from municipalities with mayors
with a lower level of education. Therefore, a simple OLS comparison between
the two types of municipalities will likely produce biased estimates due to en-
dogeneity issues. In fact, voters with different unobservable policy preferences
are highly likely to vote for different types of mayor. An RDD analysis that
exploits mixed electoral races between graduate and non-graduate mayors
could be a possible solution to these problems.
In fact, it is reasonable to assume that in close mixed electoral compe-
titions the electoral results are determined by random factors, rather than
by unobservable idiosyncratic properties of the municipality that could also
affect policies. Thus, if the all the key RDD assumptions hold, municipalities
where mayors with a college degree lost by a small margin can be used as a
control group for municipalities where they barely won. Hence, under certain
conditions, Regression Discontinuity Design makes it possible to control for
observable and unobservable municipal characteristics and to get unbiased
estimates of the parameter of interest.
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In this chapter, following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b)
and Gelman and Imbens (2014), I implement the following RDD strategy,
which is estimated by local linear regression (LLR):
Yit = ρ0 + ρ1MVit + β0Cit + β1Cit ·MVit + pi0Xit + µt + λr + ηit (2.1)
where λr are region fixed effects, µt electoral mandate fixed effects, and the
dependent variable Yit measures fiscal outcomes in municipality i at time t.
The treatment is the dummy variable Cit, which is equal to 1 for mayors with
a college degree and 0 otherwise. The margin of victory MVit is calculated
as the difference between the vote share of the graduate candidate minus the
vote share of the non-graduate, and it uniquely individuates the assignment
to treatment. When MVit = 0, the level of education of the mayor sharply
changes from 0 to 1, such that Cit = 1 and MVit > 0 in towns in which the
graduate candidate won and Cit = 0 and MVit < 0 otherwise.
Model 2.1 is estimated on the subset of towns in the range MVit ∈
[−h,+h], where the optimal bandwidth h is calculated following Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b). The main parameter is β0, which
captures the average treatment effect (ATE) of mayors with a college degree
at the zero threshold MVit = 0.
There are 3 main assumptions required for this identification to work
properly: 1) there must be no sorting around the zero threshold MVit = 0,
such that voters in municipalities with narrow mixed electoral competitions
are not able to manipulate the running variable MVit. This is tested below
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using the standard McCrary (2008) test on the continuity of the density of the
running variable at the zero thresholdMVit = 0; 2) all the available observable
municipal characteristics should vary smoothly at the zero threshold MVit =
0. This assumption is required to guarantee that municipalities on one side
of the threshold are a good counterfactual for municipalities on the other
side of the cut-off; 3) all the available observable individual characteristics
of the mayors should vary smoothly at the zero threshold MVit = 0. This
assumption is required to make sure that the estimated effect of the level
of education of a mayor on budget outcomes is not due to other individual
observable and unobservable characteristics.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are tested below running model 2.1 using municipal
and mayoral characteristics as dependent variables. As we will see below,
assumption 2 is not violated, as all the available observable municipal char-
acteristics are balanced at the zero threshold MVit = 0. The same does not
apply for assumption 3, as some individual characteristics of the mayor are
not balanced around the threshold.
The imbalance in individual covariates is raises suspicion that RDD-LLR
estimates are not reliable (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). To deal with this
issue I apply the following two solutions: 1) I run equation 2.1 including
the available unbalanced mayoral covariates in Xit. This solution does not
allow me to exclude that other unobservable characteristics change across the
zero threshold MVit = 0, but finding that RDD estimates are unchanged
after controlling for unbalanced mayoral covariates mean that I can at least
exclude that the estimated effect is due to these other characteristics which
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are correlated with the level of education of the mayor. This should give some
credibility to the RDD-LLR estimates; 2) following the recent development
by Keele, Titiunik and Zubizarreta (2015) and Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano
(2016), I implement a Propensity-Score Matching strategy, which is run using
the subsample of close mixed electoral competitions. This is described in the
next subsection.
2.4.2 Propensity-Score Matching in close elections
As explained in the previous subsection, the imbalance in individual covariates
suggests that RDD-LLR estimates may not be reliable (Brollo and Troiano,
2016). This remains true even after running the RDD model controlling for
the unbalanced mayoral covariates.
In this subsection, following the intuitions developed by Keele, Titiunik
and Zubizarreta (2015) and Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016), I apply an
empirical strategy which exploits the exogenous variation in the treatment
variable at municipal level generated by close mixed electoral competitions,
while at the same time controlling for the unbalanced individual characteris-
tics of the mayor.
This empirical strategy combines the RDD framework with Propensity-
Score Matching. In particular, the idea is to estimate the average treatment
effect of a graduate mayor on budget and political outcomes using Propensity-
Score Matching on the subsample of mixed electoral competitions decided by
a narrow margin of victory. In fact, as explained by Alesina, Cassidy and
Troiano (2016), restricting the sample to mixed electoral competitions de-
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cided by a small margin guarantees that observable and unobservable munic-
ipal characteristics are balanced across graduate and non-graduate mayors.
At the same time, the Propensity-Score Matching enables control for the indi-
vidual characteristics of the mayor which are unbalanced in the RDD setting.
In practice the idea is to run the Propensity-Score Matching estimator on
the subsample of close mixed electoral competitions controlling for as many
individual mayoral covariates as possible.
The subsample used to implement this strategy is chosen to be within
a certain window MVit ∈ [−h,+h] of the margin of victory of a graduate
mayor. The value of h is chosen to balance the need to make sure that the
treatment is independent of municipal characteristics with the need to have
a sufficient number of observations. In this chapter for the main exercises I
am using a value of h = 4 5.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Sample, descriptive statistics and balance tests
The main goal of this study is to understand whether politicians characterized
by different levels of education make different choices in terms of fiscal policies
and if they have different political career goals. The focus is on the comparison
between politicians with a college degree and politicians without a univerisity
degree.
5As an alternative, I have run the same exercise using a value of h = 3, getting very
similar results.
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As previously mentioned, in this Chapter I use the same dataset as in
Chapter 1. This includes the sample of Italian municipalities between 3000
and 7000 inhabitants for the electoral terms that go from 1993 to 2012. To
develop the empirical analysis described below, I limit the sample to the
electoral years starting from 2001. I do this because following the results
described in Chapter 1, I want to evaluate the behaviour of mayors with a
college degree comapared to those without a college degree, after the 2001
removal of fiscal rules. Therefore the regression analysis below distinguishes
between municipalities in the range 3000-5000 (i.e. municipalities not affected
by fiscal rules starting from 2001) and in the range 5000-7000 (i.e. town con-
strained by fiscal rules starting from 2001). This allows me to evaluate the
behaviour of mayors with a college degree, comapared to those without a de-
gree, under different institutional frameworks. In particular, given the results
found in Chapter 1, the goal is to understand whether more educated may-
ors elected in municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. towns in the
range 3000-5000) specifically entered the political arena to exploit the discre-
tion and flexibility enabled by the absence of fiscal rules. In addition, looking
at municipalities in the range 5000-7000, I can verify whether, where fiscal
rules apply, more educated mayors cannot behave differently in comparison
to less educated ones. Finally, I restrict the sample to mixed electoral races
in which, irrespective of the total number of competitors, a candidate with a
university degree runs against a candidate without a college degree.
This leaves me with a sample of 1500 mixed electoral competitions. Table
2.1 reports the summary statistics of these 1500 mixed electoral competitions,
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distinguishing whether the elected mayor has a college degree or not.
Regression Discontinuity Design is based on the assumption that pre-
determined covariates vary smoothly at the zero threshold MVit = 0. To test
for this assumption I run model 2.1 using municipal and mayoral character-
istics as dependent variables. The results of the balance test on municipal
characteristics can be found in Table 2.2 for municipalities between 3000 and
5000 inhabitants and in Table 2.3 for those between 5000 and 7000. The re-
sults for the balance tests on individual characteristics of the mayors can be
found in Table 2.4 for both groups of municipalities. As already anticipated
in Section 2.4, we can see from these tables that, while all municipal charac-
teristics are balanced around the zero threshold MVit = 0 in both groups of
towns, the same is not true for the individual characteristics of the mayors.
In fact, as described in Table 2.4, mayors with a college degree, comapared to
those without, tend to have less political experience, have a higher probability
of coming from high skilled jobs and are more likely to be women. This im-
balanceness of individual covariates is an issue for the RDD strategy (Brollo
and Troiano, 2016). For this reason, in the empirical analysis below I apply
the following two solutions, to verify the robustness of the RDD estimates: 1)
I run equation 2.1 including the available unbalanced mayoral covariates, to
check that these are not driving the eventual results; 2) following the recent
development by Keele, Titiunik and Zubizarreta (2015) and Alesina, Cassidy
and Troiano (2016), I implement a Propensity-Score Matching strategy, which
uses the subsample of close mixed electoral competitions.
Finally, another important assumption of the RDD strategy is that voters
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should not be able to manipulate the forcing variable MVit around the zero
threshold MVit = 0. In this framework, this would mean that voters, in
a tight mixed electoral competition, are perfectly able to choose between a
mayor with a college degree and one without. This would invalidate the RDD
identification strategy, because it would mean that the electoral outcome
is not determined by random factors in competitions decided by a narrow
margin. To test the validity of this assumption, in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 I
run the McCrary (2008) test for the continuity of the density of the running
variableMVit around the zero thresholdMVit = 0. As we can see from Figures
2.1 and 2.2, there is no evidence of discontinuity at the zero threshold. This
provides evidence about the absence of manipulation of the forcing variable
MVit on the part of voters.
2.5.2 The effect of a college degree on budget outcomes
In this subsection, I study the effect of mayors with a college degree on budget
outcomes. The analysis is split between municipalities in the range 3000-5000
and municipalities in the interval 5000-7000. This allows me to evaluate the
behaviour of mayors with a college degree, compared to those without a de-
gree, under different institutional frameworks. In particular, given the results
found in Chapter 1, the goal is to understand whether graduate mayors elected
in municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. in the range population
3000-5000) specifically entered the political arena in order to exploit the dis-
cretion and the flexibility guaranteed by the absence of fiscal rules. Besides
that, with the analysis on the municipalities in the range 5000-7000, I can
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verify whether, where fiscal rules apply, more educated mayors cannot behave
differently in comparison to less educated ones. 6
The main variable studied in this section is the average deficit run by a
mayor during an entire legislature, which is one of the main fiscal outcomes
affected by fiscal rules (Grembi et al., 2016). In the analysis the deficit is
measured as a fraction of total municipal revenues. Besides that, in this
section I also study the composition of the deficit, looking at how expenditures
and revenues are affected by a mayor with a college degree, compared to
one without it. This analysis uses two empirical strategies: 1) Regression
Discontinuity Design; 2) Propensity-score matching on the sample of mixed
electoral competitions.
The main results of the effect of a mayor with a university degree on the
deficit are reported in Table 2.5 for municipalities in the range 3000-5000 and
in Table 2.6 for municipalities in the interval 5000-7000. These are the esti-
mates obtained by RDD. In both tables I report the following specifications:
1) a local linear regression (RDD-LLR) using the optimal bandwidth h cal-
6As already noted, the wage paid to the mayors is higher in municipalities above the
5000 threshold. This may be another factor that affects the behaviour of more educated
mayors. However, the results of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), who have studied the
effect of wage using data on Italian municipalities between 1993 and 2001 (i.e. years during
which fiscal rules were not applied differently across the 5000 threshold), seem to indicate
that this should not be the case: 1) they show that the wage increase does not affect the
deficit run by the mayors, which is the main dependent variable used in this Chapter. On
the contrary, fiscal rules have been proved to be effective in reducing the deficit run by
Italian municipalities (Grembi et al., 2016); 2) Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) show
that high-paid mayors tend to spend less and raise less revenues in comparison to low-paid
ones. However, they also show that these results are due to a selection effect (i.e. high-paid
mayors are more educated), for which I am controlling, rather than to incentives. Thus,
it seems reasonable to claim that any difference found in terms of fiscal policies between
highly educated and less educated mayors in municipalities below 5000, if compared to the
same difference in those above 5000, can be attributed to the incentives determined by the
absence/presence of fiscal rules, rather than by the different wage paid.
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culated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) without
covariates in column (1) and with covariates in column (4); 2) a local linear
regression (RDD-LLR) without covariates using half (h = 2) and double (2h)
of the optimal bandwidth in columns (2) and (3). This enables examination
of how sensitive the estimates are to the choice of the bandwidth and control
function.
As we can see from Table 2.5, all the specifications indicate that mayors
with a college degree, compared to those without a college degree, tend to run
an average deficit as a fraction of total revenues which is around 2 % points
higher. This suggests that graduate mayors entered the political arena in the
municipalities below 5000 to exploit the discretion and the flexibility allowed
by the absence of fiscal rules. This is consistent with results in Chapter 1,
where I showed that municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules tend to be
more attractive for graduate individuals.
In Table 2.6, I repeat the same exercise for municipalities in the range
5000-7000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules). As we can
see, in these municipalities there are no differences between graduate mayors
and non-graduate ones. This result is also consistent with Chapter 1, which
show that municipalities above 5000, compared to those below, became less
attractive after the imposition of fiscal rules.
In both Tables 2.5 and 2.6, it is reassuring to see that the estimates
are completely unaffected by the introduction of the imbalance in individual
characteristics of the mayors. This can be seen comparing columns (1) and
(4) of both tables.
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In Tables 2.7 and 2.8, I study the composition of the deficit. In partic-
ular, in Table 2.7 I evaluate the effect of a mayor with a college degree on
expenditures, while in Table 2.8 I repeat the same exercise for revenues. In
both tables, Panel A reports the results for municipalities in the range 3000-
5000, and Panel B, municipalities in the interval 5000-7000. For all variables
I report a RDD-LLR specification using the optimal bandwidth h calculated
following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) with covariates. In
particular, I am using the optimal CCT bandwidth calculated for the deficit,
as the goal of this table is to understand how the deficit is composed. 7 All
variables are in logarithms and measured at per capita level and in real term
2010 prices.
Starting from the municipalities above 5000, we can see how mayors with
a college degree tend to reduce both total expenditures and total revenues by
a similar amount, however no one of the estimated coefficients is statistically
different from zero. This is consistent with the results found for the deficit.
On the other hand, we can see how in municipalities below the 5000 threshold
mayors with a college degree tend to cut both total expenditures and total
revenues. In particular, the higher deficit produced seems to be obtained by
cutting revenues more than expenditures. Finally, it is not completely clear
from the results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 how total expenditures and revenues are
reduced by mayors with a college degree, as all the coefficients are negative
but not statistically different from zero.
To further verify the robustness of these results I repeat these empiri-
7Results do not change if in the alternative I use the specific optimal bandwidths cal-
culated for each budget outcome.
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cal exercises using Propensity-score matching. In particular, I estimate the
average treatment effect of a mayor with a college degree running Propensity-
score matching on the subsample of mixed electoral competitions decided by
a margin of victory of four or less. Table 2.9 reports the estimated coefficients
for municipalities in the range 3000-5000, while Table 2.10 for those in the
interval 5000-7000. Panel A of both tables reports the results for deficit and
expenditures, and Panel B for revenues.
As we can see, Table 2.10 confirms the same results obtained through the
RDD analysis: in municipalities in the range 5000-7000 there are no differ-
ences in terms of fiscal policies between graduate mayors and non-graduate
ones.
The results in Table 2.9 confirm and go in the same direction of those
found by RDD for municipalities in the interval 3000-5000. In particular, the
following patterns seem to emerge from Table 2.9: 1) mayors with a college
degree tend to run higher deficits compared to those without a college degree;
2) The higher deficit is obtained by cutting total revenues more than total
expenditures; 3) the reduction of total expenditures is obtained by cutting
current expenditures; 4) the reduction in total revenues is obtained by re-
ducing taxes and fees on public services. All these results seem to confirm
that that graduate mayors entered the political arena in the municipalities
below 5000 in order to exploit the discretion and the flexibility allowed by
the absence of fiscal rules.
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2.5.3 The effect of a college degree on political career
outcomes
This subsection provides evidence about the political career paths of mayors
with a college degree, compared to those without a degree. In fact, finding
that the two types of mayors have different political career paths may help
to explain why they make different choices in terms of fiscal policies. In
this subsection, I use the following four dependent variables: 1) a dummy
variable equal to one for mayors that continue their career at municipal level;
2) a dummy variable for those elected at provincial level; 3) a dummy variable
for those elected at regional level; 4) a dummy variable for mayors promoted
at national level. 8
The analysis in this subsection uses the entire sample of municipalities
between 3000 and 7000, without dividing the towns in two groups. Table 2.1
shows that a small proportion of mayors in small Italian municipalities are
promoted to higher levels of government. This makes it difficult to analyse
a sample of mixed electoral competitions decided by a narrow margin. In
particular, as the dependent variables used in this subsection are all dummy
variables, it is difficult, after restricting the sample to tight electoral races, to
find a sufficient number of observations for which the career dummy variables
are equal to one. It becomes much more difficult to estimate precisely the
effect of a mayor with a college degree on political careers. For this reason, I
8In Italy there are five levels of government: municipalities, provinces, regions, national
parliament and European parliament. I am excluding the European level from this analysis
because it is very difficult to find mayors of small municipalities that are promoted to that
level.
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keep all the observations together to increase precision in the estimates. 9
As in Subsection 2.5.2, the analysis uses RDD and Propensity-score match-
ing. The results of the RDD estimates are reported in Table 2.11, while
those of Propensity score matching are in Table 2.12. Both tables have four
columns, one for each level of political career.
Both Tables 2.11 and 2.12 tell the same story: while there are no dif-
ferences in terms of political careers at municipal, regional or national level,
mayors with a college degree tend to have a higher probability of being elected
at the provincial level. This is a sensible result, as the provincial level is just
above the municipal level, so it makes sense for mayors of small municipalities
to try to be promoted at that level. This result is consistent with the results
of Alesina, Cassidy and Troiano (2016), who have found that young mayors
tend to be promoted more at the provincial level.
In conclusion, graduate mayors have a higher probability of having a po-
litical career. In particular, they have a higher probability of being elected
at the provincial level, the level immediately above municipalities. This may
explain why the two types of mayors make different choices in terms of fiscal
policies, especially in municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. Mayors
with a higher level of education appear to be more career oriented. For this
reason, they may prefer to be elected to toles that allow them a certain level
of flexibility and discretion, which can be used to pursue a political career.
9Another issue is that in some cases it is not possible at all to run a regression. For
example, it is impossible to run regressions on close mixed electoral competitions for the
municipalities above 5000 using the promotion at regional or national level as dependent
variables. This is because, in those tight mixed electoral competitions, the number of
mayors promoted at those levels of politics is zero.
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This suggests that graduate mayors, in municipalities not constrained by fis-
cal rules, run higher deficits to increase their popularity and pursue a political
career. Finally, this is also consistent with the results in Chapter 1, in which
I show that municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules tend to be more
attractive for graduates.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigate the fiscal implications of educated versus non-
educated political leaders. Using data on Italian municipalities, I study
whether mayors with a college degree affect fiscal policies in a different way.
The motivation for this analysis comes from the results of Chapter 1,
which shows that fiscal rules negatively affects the quality of the political
class, and in particular politicians’ education level.
The empirical analysis uses data on Italian municipalities for the electoral
terms from 2001 to 2012 and it distinguishes between municipalities not af-
fected by fiscal rules (i.e. those in the range 3000-5000) and municipalities
constrained by fiscal rules (i.e. those in the interval 5000-7000).
I use two different methodologies: 1) Regression Discontinuity Design and
2) Propensity-Score Matching. Both methodologies are developed using the
subsample of tight mixed electoral races.
The main results show that graduate mayors elected in municipalities not
constrained by fiscal rules run higher deficits. In particular, in municipalities
below 5000, graduate mayors run average deficits as a fraction of total rev-
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enues which are around 2 % points higher. These higher deficits are obtained
reducing revenues more than expenditures. I could not find any significant
difference in terms of fiscal policies for municipalities constrained by fiscal
rules (i.e. those above 5000).
Furthermore, graduate mayors appear to be more career oriented, as they
have a higher probability of being elected at the provincial level. This suggests
that they may run higher deficits to advance their career.
Therefore, the evidence in chapter 2 indicates that educated politicians
have stronger preferences for higher deficits. This may explain why educated
individuals have a lower probability to enter politics where fiscal rules apply.
This is a potential drawback of fiscal rules, which appear to make holding
political office less attractive for educated persons.
In addition to this, the results of Chapters 1 and 2 indicate that fiscal
rules have two effects on fiscal policies: 1) a direct effect, as municipalities
constrained by fiscal rules run lower deficits (Grembi et al., 2016); and 2) an
indirect effect, as fiscal rules deter the entry of individuals who prefer to run
higher deficits.
In conclusion, the results of Chapters 1 and 2 suggest both positive and
negative consequences of fiscal rules: first, fiscal rules have a positive effect on
fiscal stability, through both incentives and selection; second, fiscal rules have
a negative effect on the selection of politicians, as they make more educated
individuals less likely to enter politics. These conclusions create opportunities
for future research, as it would be interesting to complete the analysis with
data on public goods production.
120
References
Alesina A., Cassidy T. and Troiano U. (2016). “Old and young politicians."
Working paper.
Aragon F., Makarin A. and Pique R. (2015). “National Parties and Local
Development: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities.” Working paper.
Besley, Timothy, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. (2011). “Do
Educated Leaders Matter?" The Economic Journal. Volume 121, Issue
554, pp. 205-227.
Bracco E., Lockwood B., Porcelli F. and Redoano M.(2015). “Intergovern-
mental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence.”
Journal of Public Economics 123 (2015) 78–91.
Brollo F. and Nannicini T. (2012). “Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close
Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil.” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 106, No. 4 November 2012.
Brollo F. and Troiano U., (2016). “What Happens When a Woman Wins an
Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil." Journal of Development
Economics, forthcoming.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. (2014a). “Robust
Nonparametric Bias Corrected Inference in the Regression Discontinuity
Design." Econometrica. 82(6), pp. 2295-2326.
121
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., and R. Titiunik (2014b): “Robust Data-
Driven Inference in the Regression-Discontinuity Design.” Stata Journal,
14, 909–946.
Chattopadhyay, R. and Duflo, E. (2004). “Women as policy makers: ev-
idence from a randomized policy experiment in India." Econometrica
72(5): 1409–1443.
Cioffi, M., G. Messina, P. Tommasino, (2012). “Parties, institutions and polit-
ical budget cycles at the municipal level.” Temi di discussione (Economic
working papers) 885, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International
Relations Area.
Ferreira and Gyourko, (2009). ”Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from
U.S. Cities.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Ferreira, F. and Gyourko J. (2014). “Does Gender Matter for Political Lead-
ership? The Case of U.S. Mayors." Journal of Public Economics 112:
24-39.
Gagliarducci and Paserman, (2012). “Gender Interactions within Hierarchies:
Evidence from the Political Arena.” Review of Economic Studies (2012)
79, 1021–1052.
Gagliarducci, S., and T. Nannicini (2013). “Do Better Paid Politicians Per-
form Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection.” Journal of the
European Economic Association, 11, 369–398.
122
Galindo-Silva H. (2015). “New parties and policy outcomes: Evidence from
Colombian local governments.” Journal of Public Economics 126 (2015)
86–103
Gamalerio, M. (2016). “Do national political parties matter? Evidence from
Italian municipalities." Working paper.
Gelman A. and Imbens G. (2014). “Why high-order polynomials should not be
used in regression discontinuity designs." NBER Working Paper 20405.
Grembi, V., Nannicini T. and Troiano U. (2016). “Do fiscal rules matter?"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics - 8 (2016), 1-30.
Keele, L. J., R. Titiunik, and J. R. Zubizarreta (2015). “Enhancing a Geo-
graphic Regression Discontinuity Design through Matching to Estimate
the Effect of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout.” Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society: Series A, 178(1), 223–239.
McCrary, J. (2008). “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression
Discontinuity Design: A Density Test." Journal of Econometrics.
Pettersson-Libdom P. (2010). “Do parties matter for economic outcome? A
regression discontinuity approach.” Journal of European Economic Asso-
ciation, Volume 6, Issue 5, pages 1037–1056, September 2008.
123
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics:
College vs. No College
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College obs No College obs p-value
Budget outcomes
Deficit 0.011 745 0.011 749 0.930
Capital expenditures 331.522 745 359.284 749 0.131
Current expenditures 713.328 745 719.998 749 0.603
Total expenditures 1238.730 745 1276.894 749 0.192
Fee revenues 175.551 745 173.347 749 0.794
Capital grants 134.884 745 163.756 749 0.036
Current grants 172.182 745 175.536 749 0.533
Other taxes 93.549 745 95.227 749 0.619
Property and Income taxes 283.660 745 289.944 749 0.407
Total revnues 1228.730 745 1264.756 749 0.221
Political career outcomes
Elected national level 0.006 748 0.003 752 0.473
Elected regional level 0.014 748 0.010 752 0.481
Elected provincial level 0.049 748 0.063 752 0.229
Elected municipal level 0.545 748 0.519 752 0.322
Mayoral characteristics
# candidates 2.803 748 2.787 752 0.718
# council seats 10.435 748 10.601 752 0.019
National party 0.340 748 0.402 752 0.012
Political experience 6.419 748 8.559 752 0.000
Skill job 0.500 748 0.122 752 0.000
Unemployed 0.069 748 0.163 752 0.000
Female 0.122 748 0.085 752 0.016
Age 48.073 748 50.083 752 0.000
Municipal characteristics
Longitude 11.965 748 11.903 752 0.658
Latitude 43.580 748 43.636 752 0.632
Altitude 268.162 748 266.410 752 0.879
Area 36.674 748 36.254 752 0.837
South 0.284 748 0.261 752 0.322
Centre 0.153 748 0.171 752 0.350
North-West 0.342 748 0.351 752 0.719
North-East 0.219 748 0.215 752 0.857
Population 4560.799 748 4577.346 752 0.777
Past deficit 0.014 748 0.015 751 0.653
Income 13372.060 739 13539.020 742 0.243
% foreign 0.0751 748 0.075 752 0.741
Population density 338.816 748 351.078 752 0.600
% 65 0.186 748 0.187 752 0.504
% 15-64 0.669 748 0.669 752 0.659
% 0-18 0.186 748 0.185 752 0.478
Education municipal population
% college 0.075 748 0.075 752 0.677
% high secondary 0.289 748 0.289 752 0.790
% low secondary 0.314 748 0.315 752 0.577
% primary 0.221 748 0.221 752 0.905
% illiterate 0.012 748 0.012 752 0.289
Notes. Municipalities between 3000 and 7000. Electoral terms between 2001 and
2012. College = 1 for a Mayor with a college degree, No College = 1 for a Mayor
without a college degree. Columns (1) and (3) report the mean values for the two
samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value is the p-value of the difference
between the means of the two samples.
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Table 2.5: The effect of college on deficit, RDD estimates:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Linear
Bandwidth h h/2 2h h
Mayoral Covariates No No No Yes
College 0.020*** 0.021** 0.024*** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Bandwidth 7.018 3.509 14.04 7.018
Observations 267 131 467 267
Notes. Municipalities between 3000-5000 . Electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. Treat-
ment variable: College is a dummy variable =1 when the mayor has a university degree,
0 otherwise. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a,
2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Term FE included in all columns. Region FE in-
cluded in column (4). Mayoral covariates included in column (4): female = 1 if mayor is
a woman; age = age of mayor at the beginning of the term; skill job = 1 if mayor worked
in a high skill occupation in the past; unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; political
experience = years of past political experience of the mayor at any level of politics; na-
tional party = 1 if mayor affiliated to national political party; # candidates = number
of candidates at municipal elections; # seats = number of seats in the municipal council
occupied by the mayor’s coalition. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 2.6: The effect of college on deficit, RDD estimates:
Municipalities between 5000-7000 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Quadratic Linear
Bandwidth h h/2 2h h
Mayoral Covariates No No No Yes
College -0.001 -0.011 -0.000 -0.004
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Bandwidth 13.97 6.984 27.94 13.97
Observations 250 135 392 250
Notes. Municipalities between 5000-7000 . Electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. Treat-
ment variable: College is a dummy variable =1 when the mayor has a university degree,
0 otherwise. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a,
2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Term FE included in all columns. Region FE in-
cluded in column (4). Mayoral covariates included in column (4): female = 1 if mayor is
a woman; age = age of mayor at the beginning of the term; skill job = 1 if mayor worked
in a high skill occupation in the past; unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; political
experience = years of past political experience of the mayor at any level of politics; na-
tional party = 1 if mayor affiliated to national political party; # candidates = number
of candidates at municipal elections; # seats = number of seats in the municipal council
occupied by the mayor’s coalition. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 2.7: The effect of college on expenditures, RDD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Municipalities between 3000-5000
Outcome Total expenditures Capital expenditures Current expenditures
College -0.156* -0.106 -0.094
(0.092) (0.069) (0.183)
Bandwidth 7.018 7.018 7.018
Observations 267 267 267
Panel B: Municipalities between 5000-7000
Outcome Total expenditures Capital expenditures Current expenditures
College -0.113 -0.074 -0.202
(0.083) (0.076) (0.186)
Bandwidth 13.97 13.97 13.97
Observations 250 250 250
Notes. Municipalities between 3000-7000 . Electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. Treatment variable: College
is a dummy variable =1 when the mayor has a university degree, 0 otherwise. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Term and Region FE included in
all columns. Definition dependent variables: Total expenditures = log of total expenditures per capita; Capital
expenditures = log of capital expenditures per capita; Current expenditures = log of current expenditures per
capita. Mayoral covariates included in all columns: female = 1 if mayor is a woman; age = age of mayor at
the beginning of the term; skill job = 1 if mayor worked in a high skill occupation in the past; unemployed =
1 if mayor is unemployed; political experience = years of past political experience of the mayor at any level of
politics; national party = 1 if mayor affiliated to national political party; # candidates = number of candidates
at municipal elections; # seats = number of seats in the municipal council occupied by the mayor’s coalition.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 2.11: The effect of college on political career, RDD estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Future political career
Outcome =1 if elected =1 if elected =1 if elected =1 if electedmunicipal provincial regional national
level level level level
College 0.082 0.076** -0.005 -0.011
(0.063) (0.029) (0.009) (0.008)
Bandwidth 17.23 9.973 11.85 7.961
Observations 831 542 632 452
Notes. Municipalities between 3000-7000 . Electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. Treatment variable:
College is a dummy variable =1 when the mayor has a university degree, 0 otherwise. Estimation by
RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Term
and Region FE included in all columns. Definition dependent variables: column (1) =1 if mayor elected
at the municipal level of government after the experience as a mayor at any point in time; column (2) =1
if mayor elected at the provincial level of government after the experience as a mayor at any point in time;
column (3) =1 if mayor elected at the regional level of government after the experience as a mayor at any
point in time; column (4) =1 if mayor elected at the national level of government after the experience as a
mayor at any point in time. Mayoral covariates included in all columns: female = 1 if mayor is a woman;
age = age of mayor at the beginning of the term; skill job = 1 if mayor worked in a high skill occupation in
the past; unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; political experience = years of past political experience
of the mayor at any level of politics; national party = 1 if mayor affiliated to national political party; #
candidates = number of candidates at municipal elections; # seats = number of seats in the municipal
council occupied by the mayor’s coalition. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level
by ***.
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Table 2.12: The effect of college on political career, Propensity score
matching estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Future political career
Outcome =1 if elected =1 if elected =1 if elected =1 if electedmunicipal provincial regional national
level level level level
College -0.013 0.059** 0.000 0.000
(0.098) (0.028) (0.006) (0.000)
Observations 237 237 237 237
Notes. Municipalities between 3000-7000 . Electoral terms between 2001 and 2012. Treatment variable:
College is a dummy variable =1 when the mayor has a university degree, 0 otherwise. Propensity-score
matching estimates of the average treatment effect of a mayor with a college degree, obtained using the
sample of mixed electoral competitions decided by a margin of victory of four or less. Propensity score
estimated using a logistic model. Definition dependent variables: column (1) =1 if mayor elected at the
municipal level of government after the experience as a mayor at any point in time; column (2) =1 if mayor
elected at the provincial level of government after the experience as a mayor at any point in time; column
(3) =1 if mayor elected at the regional level of government after the experience as a mayor at any point in
time; column (4) =1 if mayor elected at the national level of government after the experience as a mayor
at any point in time. Mayoral covariates included in all columns: female = 1 if mayor is a woman; age
= age of mayor at the beginning of the term; skill job = 1 if mayor worked in a high skill occupation in
the past; unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; political experience = years of past political experience
of the mayor at any level of politics; national party = 1 if mayor affiliated to national political party; #
candidates = number of candidates at municipal elections; # seats = number of seats in the municipal
council occupied by the mayor’s coalition. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors calculated according
to Abadie and Imbens (2015). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and
at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 2.1: McCrary (2008) test on the margin of victory, municipalities
between 3000-5000
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Notes. Municipal elections between 2001 and 2012. Municipalities between 3000 and 5000 inhabitants.
Horizontal axis: margin of victory MVit of a candidates with a college degree vs. a candidate without a
college degree. Vertical axis: density of the margin of victory MVit. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate
has a college degree, MVit < 0 when the winning does not have a college degree. Discontinuity estimate:
point estimate 0.056, standard error 0.118 and t-statistic 0.474.
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Figure 2.2: McCrary (2008) test on the margin of victory, municipalities
between 5000-7000
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Notes. Municipal elections between 2001 and 2012. Municipalities between 5000 and 7000 inhabitants.
Horizontal axis: margin of victory MVit of a candidates with a college degree vs. a candidate without a
college degree. Vertical axis: density of the margin of victory MVit. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate
has a college degree, MVit < 0 when the winning does not have a college degree. Discontinuity estimate:
point estimate -0.077, standard error 0.168 and t-statistic -0.462.
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Chapter 3
Do national political parties
matter? Evidence from Italian
municipalities
Abstract
Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national
political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g.
“Civic Lists” in Italy). I exploit the success of “Civic Lists” in Italian munic-
ipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians,
to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. In particular, using
a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated may-
ors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less
debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities
not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a
substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides that, I provide
evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better
career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being
re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of govern-
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ment. Finally, the results are not driven by political orientation, alignment
with the central government, the presence of criminal organizations nor by
unobserved political ability.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years many countries have seen a decline in the popularity of national
political parties, which are perceived as distant from the needs of voters. At
the same time new political organizations and independent movements have
started to threaten their power. Famous examples at the national level are
Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, Ukip in the UK and the Five Stars
Movement in Italy. The same thing is happening at the local level, as in many
countries independent local organizations without links to national parties are
now able to compete and to nominate candidates. Examples of independent
local politicians can be found in both developed countries (e.g. Germany, as
described by Koethenbuerger, 2012) and developing countries (e.g. Peru, as
described by Aragon et al. 2015).
The success of these independent organizations raises questions about the
importance and the role of national political parties. In regards to this, the
main argument that can be found in the literature (Riker, 1964; Enikolopov
and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Ponce-Rodriguez et al., 2012) is that national parties
are able to discipline politicians by affecting their career prospects. However
- despite the importance of this topic - only a few studies (Koethenbuerger,
2012; Folke, 2014; Aragon et al. 2015) have tried to compare the behaviour
of party-affiliated politicians with that of independents, as a test for the
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disciplining role of national parties. The general evidence from this literature,
which is mainly focused on fiscal policies, is that party-affiliated politicians do
not behave differently from independent ones, raising doubts about the ability
of national parties to discipline politicians. However, some of these studies
(Koethenbuerger, 2012; Folke, 2014) are more focused on the behaviour of
local councillors, whose limited power, if compared to local governments,
may explain the lack of difference between party-affiliated politicians and
independents. Also, as in the case of Aragon et al. 2015, local governments
are very often subject to fiscal rules that constrain their capacity to collect
taxes and incur debt.
In this chapter, I take advantage of the success of local independent move-
ments (“Civic Lists") in Italian municipalities which, after the introduction
of the direct election of the mayor in 1993, have been able to elect a vast
number of mayors completely independent of national parties. In fact, as we
can see in Figure 3.1, the percentage of mayors affiliated to national political
parties has declined significantly in recent years in Italian municipalities. 1
This offers an interesting framework that can be used to test whether
national political parties are able to discipline politicians by affecting their
career concerns by comparing party-affiiliated and independent mayors. I
also exploit the fact that, from 2001, Italian municipalities below 5000 inhab-
itants were not subject to fiscal rules, which have been effective in limiting
the capacity of municipal governments to run deficits and accumulate debt
1In Figure 3.1, I am using the sample of municipalities below 15000. The reason is, as
described in more detail below, all the regression analysis in this chapter uses this sample
of municipalities.
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(Grembi et al., 2016).
The focus is on municipal budget outcomes, with special attention to fiscal
discipline, which represents a local outcome with national relevance, given
that fiscally undisciplined local governments generate negative externalities
for the rest of the country. This is typically the case in decentralized countries
in which local governments, largely financed through grants from higher levels
of government, may not entirely internalize the cost of spending, with clear
incentives for over-spending 2. Thus, given the lack of incentives from national
parties, we should expect independent mayors to be less fiscally responsible, as
their interests may not be aligned with national interests. On the other hand,
national parties may have an important role in disciplining local politicians,
aligning local and national interests.
The main measure of fiscal discipline used in this chapter is the average
deficit run by the mayor, divided by total average municipal revenues (i.e.
deficit as a fraction of total revenues available). As a second measure, I use
the accumulated debt over the term, which is equal to the sum of yearly
deficits/surpluses over the five years of the term, as a fraction of total av-
erage revenues. To solve endogeneity issues and to isolate the causal effect
of national parties on budget outcomes I employ a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD), which compares municipalities in which mayors affiliated to
national parties barely won with municipalities where they barely lost. The
dataset is composed of mixed electoral competitions between party-affiliated
and independent mayors for the Italian municipalities with a population be-
2This is what in the literature has been defined the "common pool" phenomenon (e.g.,
Persson and Tabellini, 1994, 2000), or the "1/n law" (Weingast et al. 1981).
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low 15000 inhabitants3 and electoral mandates between 2000 and 2012.
The main results show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally re-
sponsible. In particular, on average party-affiliated mayors run deficits as a
fraction of total revenues which are between 1.1 and 1.8 % points lower, com-
pared to those of independents. The effect is substantial from an economic
point of view and it is comparable to the effect of fiscal rules estimated by
Grembi et al. (2016) for Italian municipalities. Party-affiliated mayors also
tend to accumulate less debt during the entire legislative term compared to
independents, with a relative reduction of debt as a fraction of total revenues
of around 8.3 % points. The lower deficits of party-affiliated mayors are ob-
tained by reducing capital expenditures by approximately 23.8 %, while local
taxes are reduced by 9 %. This suggests that party-affiliated mayors reduce
deficits and accumulate less debt by cutting expenditures more than taxes.
A series of heterogeneity mechanisms are then analysed in order to under-
stand which are the channels driving the main results. First, I show that the
effect on the deficit is statistically significant only for municipalities below
5000 inhabitants, which since 2001 are not subject to fiscal rules (Grembi et
al., 2016). These rules, launched in 1999 under the name "Domestic Stability
Pact" (DSP), were introduced by the Italian government to impose limits on
municipal debts and deficits. The central government removed the rules in
2001 for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. 4 The results show
3The choice for this threshold is due to the fact that municipalities below and above
15,000 inhabitants have different electoral rules. Besides that, the percentage of indepen-
dent mayors in the cities above 15,000 inhabitants is very small (Bracco et al., 2015).
4The explanation for this exemption was to avoid to impose onerous rules on munici-
palities disadvantaged by economies of scale.
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that party-affiliated mayors reduce the deficit by around 2.4 % points in the
municipalities that are exempt from the fiscal rules, while the effect is not sta-
tistically different from zero for municipalities above the 5000 threshold. This
suggests that national parties are a substitute in constraining local politicians
where fiscal rules do not apply.
Secondly, I provide empirical evidence that political parties can discipline
politicians by affecting their career concerns (Riker, 1964; Enikolopov and
Zhuravskaya, 2007; Ponce-Rodriguez et al., 2012). This occurs in two ways:
first, I show that party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-
elected for a second term. This may be because party-affiliated mayors receive
financial and non-financial support from the national party, which can be used
to win municipal elections. I further demonstrate that party-affiliated mayors
have a higher probability of being promoted to higher levels of government.
This suggests that national political parties may use politicians’ ambitions
for promotion to higher levels of government to discipline them.
Finally, I show that the differences in career perspectives between party-
affiliated and independent mayors can be connected to the differences in fiscal
discipline. This is done in different ways: 1) exploiting the fact that in Italy
a mayor can be elected only for two consecutive terms, I show that the effect
of national parties on the deficit is statistically significant only for first-term
mayors, who could be re-elected for a second term. This indicates that the
higher deficits run by independent mayors are due to re-election incentives;
2) consistent with the first point, I demonstrate that when independents
run higher deficits, this occurs when they have won a second term. These
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two outcomes are consistent with the literature that connects deficits to re-
election incentives (see Aghion and Bolton, 1990) or to politicians’ pandering
to voters (see Maskin and Tirole, 2004); 3) I provide evidence that those
independents who run higher deficits have a low probability of being promoted
to higher levels of government. This suggests either that natonal parties use
politicians’ aspirations for promotion as a disciplining tool or that, for less
clear reasons, some independent mayors have good connections with higher
levels of government, and already have a good probability of being promoted.
Hence, those independent mayors who do not have this connection try to be
re-elected for a second time, to increase their probability of being promoted.
For this reason, they run higher deficits in comparison to party-affiliated
mayors, who already have a higher probability of being promoted.
I also provide empirical evidence that seems to exclude that the main
results are driven by other potential alternative mechanisms: 1) I show that
the results are not driven neither by the political orientation of the national
parties nor by their alignment with the central government; 2) I demonstrate
that the main results of this chapter are not driven by the presence of Mafia-
style criminal organizations; 3) I exclude that the main results are driven
by different levels of unobserved political ability between party-affiliated and
independent mayors.
This study is linked to different lines of research. First, it is related
to the literature on the role of national parties at the local level (Riker,
1964; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya; 2007; Primo and Snyder, 2010; Ponce-
Rodriguez et al., 2012; Koethenbuerger, 2012; Folke, 2014). The general
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evidence from this literature is that there are no differences between party-
affiliated and independent local politicians. With this chapter I am able to
bring new evidence about potential differences in terms of fiscal discipline
between party-affiliated and independent politicians.
In this literature four papers are closer to mine: the first one is Cioffi,
Messina and Tommasino (2012), who have already tried to compare the be-
haviour of party-affiliated and independent local politicians using data on
Italian municipalities. In my analysis, I use a different empirical strategy
(RDD rather than GMM) and I provide evidence on deficit and accumulated
debt, while their focus is on political budget cycles in expenditures. The sec-
ond is Aragon et al. (2015), who, using data from Peru, find no differences in
the fiscal behaviour of party-affiliated and independent mayors. They men-
tion that this may be due to fiscal rules that constrain the behaviour of local
politicians. With this chapter, I provide evidence that, when fiscal rules do
not apply, the behaviour of party-affiliated and independent politicians may
diverge.
The third paper is Galindo-Silva (2015) who uses RDD to compare new
and old national political parties in Colombian municipalities. He finds dif-
ferences in terms of expenditures and revenues between new and old national
political parties, but not in terms of deficit and debt accumulation. This is
again due to fiscal rules that apply to Colombian municipalities. My study
complements his paper adding a new result on deficit and debt accumulation
and focusing on a comparison between national parties and local independent
movements.
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The last paper of these papers is Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) who,
using data on Chinese provinces, have studied how career concerns can affect
the behaviour of politicians. My analysis complements their paper studying
career concerns in a democratic context, characterized by the presence of
multiple parties and independent political organizations.
This chapter is also related to the literature on the political economy of
deficit determination (Alesina and Perotti, 1999; Eslava, 2011; Alesina and
Passalacqua, 2015). I contribute to this literature, providing evidence that
national political parties may have an important role in reducing the deficits
run by local governments. This chapter is in general related to all the stud-
ies that have used RDD to analyse the behaviour of local politicians. From
this point of view, different topics have been covered: 1) the partisanship ef-
fect at the local level (Pettersson-Lidbom,2008; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009);
2) the alignment effect between local and national governments (Brollo and
Nannicini, 2012; Bracco et al. 2015); 3) the role of gender in local politics
(Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012; Brollo and Troiano, 2016).
Finally, this chapter is also related to the literature of political budget
cycles at the local level (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Drazen and Eslava,
2010; Alesina and Paradisi, 2014), as the deficits run by independent mayors
seem to be due to re-election incentives.
The chapter is organized in the following way: Section 3.2 describes the
institutional setting and Section 3.3 the data used in the empirical analysis.
Sections 3.4 is dedicated to the empirical strategy used, while Section 3.5
contains the main results of the chapter. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Institutional Setting
This chapter is focused on mayors who, following the introduction of Law 81
in 1993, have started to enjoy a high degree of power and discretion within
the municipal context. In fact, mayors are directly elected by voters and can
select the executive officers. If the municipal council wants to dismiss the
mayor, new elections must be held. In municipalities below 15,000 inhabi-
tants, mayors are elected using a single round plurality rule, while a runoff
system is in place in cities above the threshold. Mayors are elected for a term
of five years and for a maximum of two consecutive terms (i.e. they face a
term limit if re-elected).
In the sample around 73% of the mayors are independent and 27% are
affiliated to national political parties. Independent mayors are supported by
local independent organizations called “Civic Lists". These are local parties
which are autonomous from national parties or national coalitions. Civic
Lists have names that refer to the local environment or are associated with
the name of the mayoral candidate (e.g. Insieme per Bologna; Lista Rossi
Sindaco). They are generally formed in one specific municipality and do
not pursue electoral competitions in other cities or at higher levels of politics.
While there were some independent councillors in Italian municipalities before
1993, the success of local independent movements (“Civic Lists") started with
the introduction of the direct election of the mayor in 1993. In fact, since 1993,
Civic Lists have been able to elect not only councillors, but also a considerable
number of mayors. This proliferation of independents politicians constitutes
an interesting natural experiment of whether national political parties have
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a role in disciplining local politicians.
The focus of the chapter is fiscal discipline, which is a local outcome with
national relevance. This is true in decentralized countries with multiple levels
of government like Italy. Local fiscal discipline has national relevance for
two reasons: 1) the aggregated total deficit of a decentralized country is the
sum of the deficits of all levels of government. Thus, municipalities generate
negative externalities if they increase their deficit beyond reasonable levels;
2) if a local government issues a big amount of debt that it cannot repay, the
central government may have to rescue it.
Italy introduced fiscal rules in 1999, following the European Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). The “Domestic Stability Pact" (DSP) set a deficit re-
duction target for all Italian municipalities. Grembi et al. (2016) have shown
that the DSP has been effective in reducing the deficits run by municipal
governments. In 2001, the central government removed the rules for munici-
palities with less than 5000 inhabitants that did not enjoy the same economies
of scale as larger municipalities. The 2001 withdrawal of fiscal rules for small
municipalities introduced a useful set up that can be exploited to compare
the fiscal behaviour of party-affiliated and independent mayors.
Finally, it is important to note the importance of municipal governments
in Italy, which has approximately 8000 municipalities. Municipalities oversee
many services, including: municipal police, infrastructure, transport, welfare,
housing, environmental services (e.g. garbage collection) and public utilities
(e.g. water supply). Municipalities are in charge of 10% of total public ex-
penditures and they get around 20% of their revenues from local taxes, while
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the remainder comes from discretionary grants from higher levels of govern-
ment.5 Among local taxes, the most important are the property tax and
the surcharge on the personal income tax. The property tax was introduced
in 1993 by Legislative Decree 504/1992, while the surcharge on the personal
income tax was introduced in 1999.
3.3 Data
The analysis usues a dataset on Italian municipalities with a population be-
low 15,000 inhabitants. The dataset contains information about the personal
characteristics of the mayors and socio-economic characteristics of the mu-
nicipalities.
For the mayors, there is information about: 1) the party affiliation of
the mayor; 2) a detailed description of his or her political career; 3) per-
sonal characteristics such as gender, age, educational level and professional
background.
The information about the name of the political party of the mayors comes
in part from the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs and in part from sources
such as Italian newspapers’ web archives6 and an independent association
5Grants come from provinces, regions and the central state. It is important to stress
that the level of fiscal dependence on grants from higher levels of government has been
historically heterogeneous between the North and the South of Italy. For example, in
2000 municipalities in the North could finance 70% of their budget using local taxes and
revenues, while in the South grants covered 60-70% of total expenditures (Bordignon et
al., 2015). It is also important to stress that, following the financial crisis in 2008 and the
crisis linked to increasing weight of the Italian public debt, the central government has
considerably cut grants to local governments.
6See the archives on the web sites of the two main Italian newspapers: “Corriere della
Sera” and “La Repubblica”.
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called Openpolis7.
Details about which local positions mayors have held comes from the
Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs. 8 Information about the offices occupied
at National and European levels comes from the the Italian and European
parliaments.9 Finally, I have completed and checked all this information
using newspapers’ web archives and data from an independent association,
Openpolis. The description of the political career includes information about
the political offices occupied both before and after the mandates as mayor.
Information about mayors’ gender, age, education level and professional
background comes from the Italian Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
Information about municipal characteristics comes from the Italian Sta-
tistical Office (ISTAT) and includes: 1) geographical coordinates and features
(longitude, latitude, elevation and area); 2) total population and population
density; 3) income per capita; 4) number of firms; 5) the educational level of
the population (e.g. percentage of the population with a high school diploma);
6) foreign population; 7) percentage of elderly and children.
The data on municipal budget outcomes (i.e. municipal expenditures
and revenues) has been kindly provided by the Italian Ministry of Domestic
Affairs. The dataset reports information about all municipal revenues and
expenditures for the period 2000-2012.
Finally, the mafia index has been taken from Calderoni (2011), who has
7http://www.openpolis.it/
8Italy has three different levels of local government: Municipalities, Provinces and Re-
gions.
9For the Italian Parliament http://www.camera.it/ and http://www.senato.it/home.
For the European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/.
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built different versions of an index which captures the presence of Mafia-style
criminal organizations at the provincial level in Italy.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
I use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the impact on budget
outcomes of party-affiliated mayors, compared to independents. Municipali-
ties that elect party-affiliated mayors are likely to be different from municipal-
ities with independent mayors. Thus, a simple regression by OLS comparing
these two groups of municipalities will probably generate biased estimates due
to endogeneity issues. For example, voters that select different types of may-
ors might have different unobservable preferences for fiscal policies. An RDD
strategy developed using only mixed electoral competitions, in which party-
affiliated candidates compete against independent candidates, represents a
solution to these issues. In particular, it is plausible to assume that in mixed
races decided by a narrow margin, the election outcomes are determined by
random shocks and not by systematic municipal characteristics that could be
correlated with fiscal policies. Thus, under certain conditions, municipalities
where party-affiliated candidates barely lost can be used as a counterfactual
for municipalities where they barely won.
More specifically, following the recent developments introduced by Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) and Gelman and Imbens (2014), an
RDD strategy would require estimation by local linear regression (LLR) of a
model such as:
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Yit = ρ0 + ρ1MVit + δ0NPit + δ1NPit ∗MVit + λt + γr + εit (3.1)
where λt are term fixed effects, γr region fixed effects and the dependent
variable Yit is represented by different budget outcomes measured in munic-
ipality i at time t. The treatment is captured by the dummy variable NPit,
which is 1 for mayors affiliated to national parties and 0 for independents.
The assignment to treatment is uniquely determined by the margin of victory
MVit, which is calculated as the difference between the vote share of the can-
didate from a national party minus the vote share of the independent. At the
threshold MVit = 0 the affiliation status of the mayor sharply changes from
0 to 1, such that we have that NPit = 1 and MVit > 0 in municipalities in
which the candidate from a national party won and NPit = 0 and MVit < 0
in the opposite cases. The main assumption required for this identification to
work is that all relevant factors beside treatment vary smoothly at the zero
threshold MVit = 0. This is tested below.
In order to implement RDD-LLR, model 3.1 is estimated on the sub-
sample of municipalities in the interval MVit ∈ [−h,+h], where the optimal
bandwidth h is calculated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
In this setting the coefficient of interest is δ̂0, which identifies the average
treatment effect (ATE) of mayors affiliated to national parties at the zero
threshold MVit = 0.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Sample, descriptive statistics and balance tests
This study uses data on all the mayors of Italian municipalities with a popula-
tion below 15,000 inhabitants elected between 2000 and 2012. There are two
reasons behind the choice of the sample: 1) municipalities with a population
below 15,000 have an electoral law which is different from that of cities above
the threshold. This creates different electoral incentives in terms of coali-
tions, presence of national political parties and number of candidates; 2) the
percentage of independent candidates is very small in municipalities above
the threshold. In particular, below the threshold around 73% of mayors are
independents and 27% party-affiliated, while above 15,000 inhabitants only
around 5% of the mayors are not affiliated to national parties (see Bracco et
al., 2015). This makes municipalities below the threshold of 15,000 people
more suitable for the type of empirical exercise developed in this study.
There are 11,592 electoral competitions and 5857 municipalities for which
I have a complete set of values for municipal and mayoral characteristics. To
implement the RDD strategy, I restrict the sample to mixed electoral races
in which, irrespective of the total number of competitors, a candidate from a
national party runs against an independent. In particular, a mixed electoral
competition is defined as a race in which there is at least one candidate
affiliated to a national party and one independent among the competitors that
finished in the first two positions at the election. The sample is also limited to
those legislative terms for which I do not have missing values in the past value
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of the main dependent variable (i.e. average deficit from the previous term) or
at least the value for the first year of the term. This is because the past values
of the deficit are used to check that party-affiliated mayors are not elected
in municipalities characterized by different initial values of the dependent
variable. As an alternative, because for some terms I do not observe the value
of the deficit from the previous term, I also check the value of the dependent
variable in the first year of the term 10. This leaves me with a sample of 2809
mixed electoral competitions and 2239 municipalities. Table 3.1 reports the
summary statistics for these 2809 mixed electoral competitions, distinguishing
whether the elected mayor is from a national party or is an independent.
The main assumption of the RDD strategy is that pre-determined co-
variates should not exhibit discontinuities at the zero threshold MVit = 0.
To test for this, I run model 3.1 using as dependent variables municipal and
mayoral characteristics and the value of the deficit from the previous electoral
term. The results are reported in Panels A, B and C of Table 3.2. All the
pre-determined characteristics are balanced at the zero threshold MVit = 0:
as we will see below, a big part of the analysis is developed using only mu-
nicipalities below the 5000 threshold (i.e. municipalities not constrained by
fiscal rules). For this reason, in the Appendix Table A.1, I repeat the same
balance tests only for municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. As we can see,
even for municipalities below this threshold all the covariates are balanced at
10In Italy municipal elections are usually held in late Spring, so that during electoral
years it is possible to have two different mayors. Thus the value of the dependent variable
in the first year of the term is decided by two overlapping mayors, and, from a certain
point of view, it can be seen as the initial fiscal situation that the new mayor inherits from
the old one, even though in the second part of the first year the new mayor can change the
situation.
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the zero threshold MVit = 0.
Finally, the other crucial assumption of the RDD strategy is that vot-
ers should not be able to manipulate the forcing variable MVit close to the
zero threshold. In fact, if voters were perfectly able to choose between an
affiliated and an independent candidate in a close race, this would indicate
that the electoral outcome is not determined by random factors. This would
raise doubts about the identification strategy. To test the validity of this
assumption, I inspect the histogram of the margin of victory MVit, which is
reported in Figure 3.2 for all municipalities, and in Figure 3.3 for munici-
palities below 5000 only. As we can see in Figure 3.2 and 3.3, there are not
spikes at the two sides of the zero threshold MVit = 0. These results are also
formally confirmed by the McCrary (2008) tests described by Figure 3.4 and
3.5, which show that there is no discontinuity in the density of MVit around
the threshold. In fact, in both Figures 3.4 and 3.5, I cannot reject the null
assumption of continuity of the density of the running variable at the zero
threshold MVit = 0.
3.5.2 The effect of national parties on fiscal discipline
To estimate the impact on fiscal discipline of party-affiliated mayors in com-
parison to independent ones, I run model 3.1 on the main dependent variable,
which is the deficit run by the mayor as a fraction of total revenues. This
allows estimation of the average effect of party-affiliated mayors on fiscal dis-
cipline over an entire legislative term. The main results are described by
Table 3.3, in which I report the following different specifications: 1) a local
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linear regression (RDD-LLR) using the optimal bandwidth h calculated fol-
lowing Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) without covariates
in column (1) and with covariates in column (2); 2) a local linear regression
(RDD-LLR) with covariates using half (h/2) of the optimal bandwidth in
column (3); 3) RDD regressions using the double of the optimal bandwidth h
and quadratic and cubic control functions in the margin of victory in columns
(4) and (5). This allows investigation of how much the estimates are sensitive
to the choice of the bandwidth and of the control function.
The picture that emerges from Table 3.3 is that party-affiliated mayors
are more fiscally responsible compared to independents. In fact, looking at
the results of the linear specification using the optimal bandwidth h and con-
trolling for covariates (column 2), we can see that on average party-affiliated
mayors run a deficit as a fraction of total revenues which is around 1.1%
points lower compared to that of independents. The estimated effect is ro-
bust to the choice of different bandwidths and control functions, and it does
not change if I remove the control variables (column 1). This effect is compa-
rable to the effect of fiscal rules estimated by Grembi et al. (2016) for Italian
municipalities. The same result is visualized in Figure 3.6.
The main consequence of the baseline result in Table 3.3 is that party-
affiliated mayors tend to accumulate less debt during the entire legislative
term 11. In fact, as we can see from Table 3.4 (column 1, Panel A), the debt
as a fraction of total revenues accumulated by party-affiliated mayors is 8.3%
11In this chapter, the accumulated debt over the term is calculated as a fraction of average
total revenues over the term = (
5∑
t=1
(total expenditurest-total revenuest)/(total revenues).
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points lower compared to that of independents. 12
Finally, to evaluate how fiscal discipline is achieved by party-affiliated
mayors I run model (1) on a series of budget outcomes: 1) capital and cur-
rent expenditures (Table 3.4, Panel A, columns 2 and 3); 2) total transfers
received by higher levels of government (Table 3.4, Panel B, column 1); 3) fis-
cal revenues from all the local taxes managed by the mayor (Table 3.4, Panel
B, column 2); 4) fiscal revenues from the property and the income taxes,
which represent the main fiscal tools managed by mayors (Table 3.4, Panel
B, columns 3). For all variables I report a RDD-LLR specification using the
optimal bandwidth h calculated following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014a, 2014b) with covariates. In particular, in Table 3.4, I use the optimal
CCT bandwidth calculated for the deficit, as the goal of this table is to un-
derstand how the deficit is composed. 13 All variables are in logarithms and
measured at per capita level and in 2010 prices.
The results in Table 3.4 show that for all these budget outcomes the sign of
the coefficients is negative, indicating that in general party-affiliated mayors
run lower budgets. However, the coefficients are statistically significant at the
standard levels only for capital expenditures, total local taxes and property
and income taxes. The magnitude of the effect for capital expenditures is
in absolute value greater than that for taxes, a result that suggests that
12In column 1 of Table 3.4, the number of observations is smaller because I am keeping
only the legislative terms without missing values in the yearly observations of the deficit
and electoral mandates not affected by early interruptions (i.e. mandates that last for all
the 5 years). This allows me to calculate the accumulated debt in the same way for all the
mayors. I get similar results if I repeat the exercise with all the original electoral mandates.
13Results do not change if I use the specific optimal bandwidths calculate for each budget
outcome.
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party-affiliated mayors reduce the deficit and accumulate less debt cutting
expenditures more than taxes. In fact, party-affiliated mayors tend to reduce
capital expenditures by approximately 23.8% and local taxes by around 9%.
3.5.3 The role of fiscal rules
Fiscal rules were introduced in Italy in 1999. In 2001, the central government
removed the rules for municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. This
allows to run two separated RDD-LLR exercises: one for municipalities with
less than 5000 inhabitants, which are exempted from the rules, and one for
municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants. The results are reported
in Table 3.5 for municipalities below 5000, and Table 3.6 for municipalities
above the threshold.
In both Tables 3.5 and 3.6, besides reporting the same specifications al-
ready used in Table 3.3, I add column (3), in which I control for the individual
characteristics of the mayors. This is because fiscal rules do not represent the
only policy changing at the 5000 threshold: at the same threshold there is an
increase in the wage paid to the mayor. In practice, the results of Gagliar-
ducci and Nannicini (2013) show that this wage increase affects the selection
of politicians, and in particular the level of education of mayors. For this
reason, I added a specification in which I control for the potential different
selection of mayors across the 5000 threshold, which may affect fiscal disci-
pline. 14
14The wage increase at the 5000 threshold may be another factor influencing the be-
haviour of mayors, besides fiscal rules. For example, differences in terms of fiscal policies
between party-affiliated and independent mayors, in municipalities below 5000, may be due
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The estimated coefficients reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 clearly show
that the effect on deficit is statistically significant and substantial from an
economic point of view only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules.
In particular, the effect of party-affiliated mayors on deficit in municipalities
below 5000 is equal to a reduction that goes from 1.3 % points to 2.4 %
points, depending on the specification used. On the other hand, the coef-
ficients estimated for municipalities above the 5000 threshold are small and
never statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the effect on deficit for
municipalities with a population below 5000 inhabitants is comparable in
magnitude to the effect of fiscal rules estimated by Grembi et al. (2016) for
Italian municipalities. This suggests that, where fiscal rules do not apply,
national parties act as a substitute for them in constraining politicians.
Besides that, as we can see from both Tables 3.5 and 3.6, controlling for
the individual characteristics of the mayors in column (3) does not affect in
any way the estimated coefficients. This seems to indicate that the selection
to a different reaction to the lower wage paid, rather than to the absence of fiscal rules.
The same argument could be applied to municipalities above the threshold. However, the
results of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), who have studied the effect of wage using
data on Italian municipalities between 1993 and 2001, indicate that the wage should not
play this confounding role: 1) first, Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) show that high-paid
mayors tend to spend less and collect less revenues. However, they also show that these
results are due to a selection effect determined by the higher wage (i.e. high-paid mayor
tend to be more educated), rather than to incentive effects driven by the wage increase. In
my analysis I directly control for this selection effect; 2) Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013)
show that the wage increase does not affect the deficit (i.e. the main dependent variable
used here). On the contrary, fiscal rules have proved to be effective in reducing the deficit
run by Italian municipalities (Grembi et al., 2016). Hence, although it is not possible to
completely exclude potential effects driven by the the wage, it is reasonable to state that
differences in terms of fiscal policies between party-affiliated and independent mayors in
municipalities below 5000, compared to the same difference in those above 5000, should
be due to incentives determined by the absence/presence of fiscal rules, rather than by the
lower wage paid.
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of politicians determined by the wage increase is not playing any role in this
context.
Finally, the same results are confirmed by Figures 3.7 and 3.8.
3.5.4 The role of career incentives
In this section, I provide empirical evidence of the mechanisms through which
national political parties can discipline politicians. As indicated by the lit-
erature (Riker, 1964; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Ponce-Rodriguez
et al., 2012), political parties can discipline politicians by affecting their ca-
reer prospects. In particular, political parties have the power to candidate
politicians at different levels of government 15. Besides that, political par-
ties have financial and non-financial resources that they can use to help their
candidates at local elections.
Thus, the first goal of this section is to investigate whether party-affiliated
politicians have different career perspectives, compared to independent ones.
In particular, party-affiliated and independent mayors may have different ca-
reer perspectives in the following ways: 1) they may have different probabil-
ities of re-running as mayoral candidates; 2) they may have different prob-
abilities of being re-elected as mayors for a second term; 3) they may have
different probabilities of being a candidate at higher levels of government.
These dimensions are described in Table 3.1 through descriptive statistics,
and in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 through the RDD-LLR analysis.
15In Italy there are four levels of government, which starting from the lower are: munici-
palities, provinces, regions and national level. Besides these, Italian politicians can also be
elected to the European parliament. Thus, there are different ways through which a mayor
can be promoted to higher levels of government.
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Different long term career perspectives may explain the different fiscal
behaviours of party-affiliated mayors and independents. Hence, the second
goal of this section is to connect the different career probabilities with the
differences in fiscal discipline. This is presented in Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.
The first goal of this section is to provide evidence about the differences in
career perspectives between party-affiliated mayors and independents. While
nothing prevents an independent from running for office at higher levels of
government, candidates for provincial, regional, national and European levels
of government are decided by political parties. Thus, party-affiliated mayors
should have better connections and exhibit a higher probability of promotion.
At the same time, in municipal elections party-affiliated mayors may receive
financial and non-financial support from the national party. Hence, party-
affiliated mayors should have a higher probability of being elected for a second
term.
These intuitions are confirmed by the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1. As
we can see, mayors affiliated to national political parties have a higher proba-
bility of re-election for a second term. In particular, 53.4 % of party-affiliated
mayors are re-elected for a second term and just 46.7 % of independents.
These results do not seem to be driven by different probabilities of running
for a second term.
In terms of promotion to higher levels of government, we can see how
party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being a candidate at the
provincial level, compared to independents (8 % vs. 6 %). A similar difference
seems to emerge if we consider all the levels of government above the municipal
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level together (provincial, regional and national). In this case, the percentage
of promoted mayors is 17.9 % for party-affiliated mayors and 14.3 % for
independents.
The differences observed in the descriptive statistics may be driven by
other unobservable factors. For this reason, in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, I apply
the RDD analysis to the different variables capturing the career prospects of
mayors. As the differences in terms of fiscal discipline can be found only in
municipalities not affected by fiscal rules, the analysis starting from this point
is split between municipalities below 5000 inhabitants (i.e. municipalities not
constrained by fiscal rules) and municipalities between 5000 and 15000 (i.e.
those affected by fiscal rules). The results for municipalities below 5000 are
reported in Table 3.7, while those for municipalities above 5000 are in Table
3.8. In both tables, I report two specifications for each dependent variable:
one with the optimal bandwidth without municipal covariates, and one with
the same interval and controlling for municipal covariates.
The estimated coefficients in Table 3.7 clearly indicate that party-affiliated
mayors, elected in towns not affected by fiscal rules, have better career prospects,
compared to independent mayors. In particular: 1) the results in columns
(3)-(4) indicate that party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of be-
ing re-elected for a second term. This difference in probability is more than
20 %; 2) the differences in re-election probability do not seem to be driven
by differences in the probability of being the mayoral candidate for a second
time, as described by columns (1) and (2); 3) party-affiliated mayors, com-
pared to independents, have a probability of being candidate at the provincial
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level of government which is approximately 11 % higher (columns (5)-(6)).
This result is sensible, as the provincial level of government is the level im-
mediately above municipalities; 4) columns (7)-(8) show that party-affiliated
mayors have in general a higher probability of being a candidate at higher
levels of government, although the results in these columns are not precisely
estimated.
The same differences in terms of career perspectives cannot be found in
municipalities above 5000, as all the coefficients reported in Table 3.8 are
small and not statistically different from zero. This may be explained by the
fact that mayors in bigger municipalities have more visibility, even if they
are not affiliated to a national party. This higher visibility may help them in
pursuing a political career. Alternatively, mayors in bigger municipalities may
have a higher probability of being connected to higher levels of government,
even if they are independents.
Thus, the results of Tables 3.7 and 3.8 seem to indicate that party-affiliated
mayors, if compared to independents, have better career perspectives, espe-
cially in small municipalities.
The second goal of this section is to connect the different career probabili-
ties with the differences in fiscal discipline. Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 contains
estimated coefficients for municipalities below 5000.
In Table 3.9, I investigate if the higher deficits run by independent mayors
are due to potential re-election incentives. In particular, in this exercise I
exploit the fact that in Italy a mayor can only be elected for two consecutive
terms, i.e. second term mayors are term-limited. This allows me to evaluate
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whether the higher deficits run by independent mayors are due to re-election
incentives. I run two separate RDD-LLR empirical exercises: one for first-
term mayors and one for second term ones (i.e. term-limited mayors). In
columns (1)-(2), I report the specification with the optimal bandwidth, while
in columns (3)-(4), I check the robustness of the results using half of the
optimal bandwith. I particular, in Table 3.9 I use the optimal CCT bandwidth
calculated for the main regressions on deficit for municipalities below 5000
(see Table 3.5), as the goal of the exercise here is to understand which type
of mayors (i.e. first term or second term) is driving the main results in Table
3.5.
The estimated coefficients show that the effect is statistically significant
only for first-term mayors. In particular, first-term party-affiliated mayors
run deficits which are between 1.5 and 2.8 % points lower than those run by
independents. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for second-term
party-affiliated mayors are not statistically different from zero. This seem
to indicate that the higher deficits run by independent mayors are due to
re-election incentives. This is consistent with the literature that connects
deficits to re-election incentives (see Aghion and Bolton, 1990) or to politi-
cians’ pandering to voters (see Maskin and Tirole, 2004).
To provide further evidence on this point, I implement an additional em-
pirical exercise in which I distinguish between first-term mayors who are re-
elected for a second term and first-term mayors who are not re-elected. The
results are reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 3.10. As re-election is an out-
come for the national party treatment, in order to avoid potential biases due
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to endogeneity issues, following the intuitions of Ferraz and Finan (2011) I
repeat the exercise using the predicted probability of being re-elected, rather
than the observed re-election status. This predicted probability is obtained
regressing the re-election status on pre-determined municipal and mayoral
characteristics 16. The estimates obtained by splitting the sample using the
predicted probabilities are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.10.
As we can see, the results of Table 3.10 indicate that the higher deficits
produced by independent mayors are run by those mayors who have been
successful in being re-elected for a second term. This provides additional
evidence that the higher deficits run by independent mayors are due to re-
election incentives. Thus, in connection with the results reported in Table 3.7,
it seems that party-affiliated mayors, compared to independents, seem to run
lower deficits because they already have an electoral advantage due to their
affiliation. In fact, party-affiliated mayors receive the support of national
parties during the campaign and thus they should have more resources at
their disposal. This should create an electoral disadvantage for independents.
Finally, in Table 3.11, I provide empirical evidence about the connection
between promotion to higher levels of government and the differential fiscal
behaviour of party-affiliated and independent mayors. As described by Table
3.7, party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being promoted at
16In particular, I have regressed by logit the re-election dummy variable on the following
variables: the margin of victory at municipal election, population, elderly index, income,
dummy variable for national party, age, dummy variable for graduate mayor, past politi-
cal experience, past professional background, region and term FE effects. The predicted
probability has been then transformed in a dummy variable equal to one if the predicted
probability is higher than 0.5. This has been used to run the regressions in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 3.10. This estimation procedure correctly predicted 66.47 % of the cases.
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provincial level. For this reason, with an exercise similar to the one devel-
oped in Table 3.10, in Table 3.11 I study the effect of national parties on
fiscal discipline distinguishing between mayors candidate at provincial level,
and mayors not promoted at provincial level. The results of this exercise are
reported in columns (1) and (2). As promotion to higher levels of government
is a dependent variable for national party treatment, following the same intu-
ition used in Table 3.10, in columns (3) and (4) I use the predicted probability
of being a candidate at provincial level rather than the actual observed one
17.
As we can see, both exercises in Table 3.11 indicate that the higher deficits
produced by independent mayors are run by those mayors who have a low
probability of being candidate at provincial level. In fact, among the mayors
who have been promoted at provincial level, there are no differences in terms
of fiscal discipline between party-affiliated and independent first citizens.
These last results can be interpreted in two ways: 1) for some unknown
reasons, some independent mayors have good connections with the provincial
level of government, and thus they already have a good probability of being
promoted. Hence, those independent mayors who do not have this connec-
17In particular, I have regressed by logit promotion to provincial level on the following
variables: the margin of victory at municipal election, population, elderly index, income,
dummy variable for national party, dummy variable for term limited mayor, age, dummy
variable for graduate mayor, past political experience, past professional background, region
and term FE effects. The predicted probability has been then transformed in a dummy
variable equal to one if the predicted probability is higher than 0.1. In this case, I have used
a lower threshold (0.1 rather than 0.5), because a small proportion of mayors are promoted
to higher levels of government. For example, the threshold 0.5 for the predicted probability
of being candidate at provincial level is above the 99th percentile of the distribution. This
has been used to run the regressions in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.11. This estimation
procedure correctly predicted 92.86 % of the cases.
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tion try to be re-elected to increase their popularity and achieve promotion
at the provincial level of government. For this reason, they run higher deficits
in comparison to party-affiliated mayors, who already have a higher proba-
bility of being promoted; 2) national parties use promotion to higher levels
of government as a disciplining device. Thus, all the mayors that want to
be candidate at provincial level must keep the deficit low, even independent
ones.
3.5.5 Other potential mechanisms
In this section, I investigate other potential mechanisms that may drive the
main results. In particular, the goal of this section is to provide empirical
evidence that excludes that the main results of this chapter are driven by
these other potential mechanisms. In particular, in this section I investigate
the following potential mechanisms: 1) political orientation (i.e. Centre-left
vs. centre-right national parties ); 2) alignment with the central government
(i.e. Aligned vs. non-aligned mayors); 3) the role of Mafia style criminal
organizations; 4) the role of unobserved political ability.
Centre-left vs. centre-right. In this paragraph, I investigate if both party-
affiliated mayors from centre-left and centre-right national parties have a
role in disciplining politicians 18. This exercise is implemented in order to
exclude that the main results of the chapter are due to a particular political
18In Italy, in the years between 1993 and 2013, it was possible to clearly identify two big
political coalitions: one, on the centre-right, was the coalition driven by Silvio Berlusconi.
The other, on the centre-left, was the coalition driven by the heirs of the past Italian
Communist Party.
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orientation of the mayor. To implement this exercise, I run model (1) on
two different samples: 1) a sample of mixed electoral competitions between
centre-right party-affiliated mayors and independent ones; 2) a sample of
mixed electoral competitions between centre-left party-affiliated mayors and
independent ones. The results of these two exercises are reported in Table
3.12. In particular, columns (1) and (3) make reference to the comparison
between centre-right party affiliated mayors and independents, while columns
(2) and (4) look at the other comparison. In columns (1)-(2) I use the optimal
bandwidth, while in columns (3)-(4) half of the optimal bandwidth.
As we can see, both centre-left and centre-right party-affiliated mayors
reduce the average deficit compared to independents. In particular, centre-
right party-affiliated mayors tend to reduce the deficit by between 1.3% and
2.2 % points, depending on the bandwidth used, while the effect for centre-
left mayors is between 1.7 % and 3.9% points. These estimated coefficients
indicate that the main results are mostly driven by a national political parties’
effect, rather than the political orientation of the mayor.
Aligned vs. non-aligned mayors. The same logic can be applied to cases
of party-affiliated mayors that are politically aligned with the central govern-
ment at the national level, compared to those that are not. In fact, there
is a literature (Bracco et al., 2015; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012) that shows
that alignment with the central government affects the incentives and re-
sources of local politicians. To implement this exercise, I run model (1) on
two different samples: 1) a sample of mixed electoral competitions between
non-aligned party-affiliated mayors and independents; 2) a sample of mixed
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electoral competitions between aligned party-affiliated mayors and indepen-
dents. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3.13. In particular,
columns (1) and (3) make reference to the comparison between non-aligned
party affiliated mayors and independents, while columns (2) and (4) look at
the other comparison. In columns (1)-(2) I use the optimal bandwidth, while
in columns (3)-(4) half of the optimal bandwidth.
Both non-aligned and aligned party-affiliated mayors reduce the average
deficit compared to independents. In particular, the estimated effect for non-
aligned party affiliated mayors is between 1.2% and 2.4 % points, depending
on the bandwidth used, while the effect for aligned party-affiliated mayors
is between 1.8 % and 3.4% points. Finally, the coefficients in columns (1)
and (2) are not precisely estimated. However, when I use half of the optimal
bandwidth, I get coefficients which are bigger in absolute value and statisti-
cally different from zero. As in the RDD analysis there is a trade-off between
bias and efficiency (i.e. lower bias with a smaller bandwidth at the cost of
lower efficiency, given the smaller number of observations), we can trust that
the coefficients obtained with half of the optimal bandwidth are closer in
magnitude to the true effect.
As for the previous section, these estimated coefficients also show that the
main results of the chapter are due to a national political parties effect.
The role of Mafia-style criminal organizations. I provide here empirical
evidence which is useful for excluding the possibility that the main results of
this chapter are driven by Mafia style criminal organizations. In particular,
it may be that independent mayors are more easily captured by criminal
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organizations, compared to party-affiliated ones. This may have an effect on
fiscal discipline.
To exclude this possibility, I run two separate RDD exercises, in which
I compare the fiscal behaviour of party-affiliated mayors with that of inde-
pendents in two different contexts: 1) municipalities characterized by a low
presence of criminal organizations; 2) municipalities characterized by a high
presence of criminal organizations. To distinguish between these two envi-
ronments, I use a Mafia index built by Calderoni (2011), which quantifies the
presence of Mafia style criminal organizations in Italian provinces. The results
of this exercise are reported in Table 3.14. In particular, columns (1) and (3)
make reference to municipalities with a value of the Mafia index below the
median (i.e. low presence of criminal organizations), while columns (2) and
(4) look at municipalities with a value above the median (i.e. high presence
of criminal organizations). In columns (1)-(2) I use the optimal bandwidth,
while in columns (3)-(4) half of the optimal bandwidth.
The estimated coefficients in Table 3.14 suggest that the main results of
this chapter are not driven by Mafia-style criminal organizations. In fact,
party-affiliated mayors, compared to independents, tend to run lower deficits
in both municipalities with a low presence of criminal organizations and mu-
nicipalities with a high presence of criminal organizations.
The role of unobserved political ability. As observed in Table 3.2, party-
affiliated mayors and independents tend to have the same level of past political
experience. However, this does not exclude that they may have a different
level of unobserved political ability.
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I argue that the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3.10 provide ev-
idence that unobserved political ability is not one of the main drivers of the
results of this chapter. In fact, as argued by Ferraz and Finan (2011), mayors
who were able to be re-elected for a second term should be characterized by
the same level of unobserved political ability. Thus, the results of Table 3.10,
which show that the higher deficits produced by independents are run by
mayors who were re-elected for a second term, demonstrate that unobserved
political ability is not one of the drivers of the results of this chapter. This is
because party-affiliated and independent mayors re-elected for a the second
term should be characterized by the same level of unobserved political ability.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I exploit the proliferation in Italian municipalities of local
independent movements (“Civic Lists") to make a comparison between mayors
affiliated to national parties and independents. This framework is used to test
whether political parties are able to discipline politicians by affecting their
career prospects.
The results show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible.
In fact, mayors affiliated to national parties run deficits as a fraction of total
revenues which are between 1.1% and 1.8 % points lower. Besides that, party-
affiliated mayors accumulate less debt during the legislative mandate, with
a reduction of debt as a fraction of total revenues of about 8.3% points.
The results show that the lower deficits are generated by cutting capital
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expenditures by approximately 23.8% and by reducing local taxes by 9%. This
indicates that mayors affiliated to national parties cut deficits and accumulate
less debt by reducing expenditures more than taxes.
A heterogeneity analysis is then implemented to study which channels are
driving the main results. First, the effect on deficit is statistically significant
only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules (Grembi et al., 2016):
party-affiliated mayors reduce the deficit by around 2.4 % points in munic-
ipalities exempted by the fiscal rules, while the effect is not different from
zero in municipalities constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that, where
fiscal rules do not apply, national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in
constraining local politicians.
Second, the results indicate that political parties discipline politicians by
affecting their career prospects (Riker, 1964; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya,
2007; Ponce-Rodriguez et al., 2012). This is done in two ways: 1) party-
affiliated mayors have a higher re-election probability, compared to indepen-
dents; and 2) party-affiliated mayors are more likely to be promoted to higher
levels of government.
Then, this Chapter provides evidence that the differences in career prospects
between party-affiliated and independent mayors are linked to the differences
in fiscal behaviour. In particular: 1) the effect of national parties on deficit is
significant only for mayors eligible for re-election; 2) the higher deficits run by
independents are produced by mayors who have been successfully re-elected.
These two results are consistent with the literature on the correlation between
deficits and re-election incentives (see Aghion and Bolton, 1990) or with the
172
literature that explains how to politicians pander to voters (see Maskin and
Tirole, 2004); 3) the higher deficits produced by independents are run by
mayors who are less likely to be promoted to higher levels of government.
This suggests that career prospects can be used by political parties to disci-
pline politicians. An alternative explanation may be that, for some unknown
reasons, some independents have good connections with higher levels of gov-
ernment, and thus they already have a good probability of being promoted.
Thus, those independents without good connections try to be re-elected, to
increase their chances of being promoted. For this reason, they run higher
deficits.
Finally, I rule out the following alternative stories: 1) the results are not
driven by the political orientation nor by alignment with the central govern-
ment; 2) the main results are not driven by Mafia-style criminal organizations;
3) I exclude that the main results are driven by unobserved political ability.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics:
Party-affiliated vs. Independent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party Affiliated obs Independent obs p-value
Budget outcomes
Deficit 0.013 1430 0.018 1379 0.043
Accumulated debt 0.056 1430 0.069 1379 0.011
Property and Income taxes 285.114 1430 293.156 1379 0.168
Total taxes 413.616 1430 424.778 1379 0.140
Total transfers 475.890 1430 473.309 1379 0.911
Political career outcomes
re-run 0.668 679 0.646 642 0.395
re-elected 0.534 679 0.467 642 0.014
candidate provincial level 0.080 1430 0.060 1379 0.036
candidate provincial, regional and national level 0.179 1430 0.143 1379 0.009
Mayoral characteristics
term limit 0.260 1430 0.275 1379 0.356
Political experience 7.240 1430 7.174 1379 0.764
Skill job 0.238 1430 0.235 1379 0.861
Unemployed 0.109 1430 0.144 1379 0.004
Age 49.708 1430 50.930 1379 0.000
Female 0.120 1430 0.110 1379 0.406
# candidates 2.797 1430 2.806 1379 0.806
# council seats 9.911 1430 9.685 1379 0.000
Municipal characteristics
daily newspapers 77.353 1413 81.312 1354 0.002
Mafia index 4.786 1430 5.148 1379 0.404
% foreign 0.076 1408 0.071 1360 0.004
longitude 12.065 1408 11.549 1360 0.000
latitude 43.527 1408 43.750 1360 0.010
altitude 298.852 1408 299.674 1360 0.931
area 35.273 1408 30.739 1360 0.001
Past deficit 0.014 1349 0.015 1327 0.765
Income 13528.330 1430 13623.480 1379 0.386
# firms 0.078 1430 0.077 1379 0.069
% 65 1.686 1430 1.643 1379 0.323
population 4694.609 1430 4333.279 1379 0.004
Notes. Municipalities below 15000. Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Party Affiliated = 1 for a Mayor
affiliated to a national political party, Independent = 1 for a Mayor not affiliated to a national political party.
Columns (1) and (3) report the mean values for the two samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value is the
p-value of the difference between the means of the two samples.
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Table 3.3: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline, RDD estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
Bandwidth h h h/2 2h 2h
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
National Party -0.011** -0.011** -0.018** -0.013** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Outcome mean 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015
Bandwidth 9.888 9.888 4.944 19.78 19.78
Observations 990 990 487 1,684 1,684
Notes. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation
by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector.
Treatment variable: National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national political
party. Region and term FE included in all columns except column (1). Covariates included in columns
(2)-(5): pop = log of municipal population at the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of
municipal population above 65; income = log of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.4: The effect of national party on debt, expenditures and revenues,
RDD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Debt and Expenditures
Control Function Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth h h h
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Accumulated debt Capital expenditures Current expenditures
National Party -0.083** -0.214** -0.033
(0.034) (0.084) (0.029)
Bandwidth 9.888 9.888 9.888
Observations 644 990 990
Panel B: Revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth h h h
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Total transfers Total taxes Property and income taxes
National Party -0.031 -0.084** -0.099**
(0.071) (0.039) (0.043)
Bandwidth 9.888 9.888 9.888
Observations 990 990 990
Notes. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-
LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Treatment variable:
National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national political party. Region and term
FE included in all columns. Definition dependent variables Panel A: Accumulated debt = summation of yearly
deficits/surpluses produced during the electoral term as a fraction of total revenues; Capital expenditures = log
of capital expenditures per capita; Current expenditures = log of current expenditures per capita. Definition
dependent variables Panel B: Total transfers = log of current + capital transfers from higher levels of government;
Total taxes = log of total municipal taxes raised by the mayor; Property and income taxes = log of property +
income taxes raised by the mayor. Covariates included in columns (1)-(3): pop = log of municipal population at
the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65; income = log of income
per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.5: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline, RDD estimates:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
Bandwidth h h h h/2 2h 2h
Municipal covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mayoral covariates No No Yes No No No
National Party -0.013** -0.014** -0.014** -0.024*** -0.014** -0.021**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Outcome mean 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.017
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 14.85 7.426 29.70 29.70
Observations 851 851 851 457 1,294 1,294
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 inhabitants (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules). Electoral terms
between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b)
optimal bandwidth h selector. Treatment variable: National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is
affiliated to a national political party. Region and term FE included in all columns except column (1). Municipal
covariates included in columns (2)-(6): pop = log of municipal population at the beginning of the electoral term;
elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65; income = log of income per capita. Mayoral covariates
included in column (3): female = 1 if mayor is a woman; age = age of mayor at the beginning of the term;
postgraduate = 1 if mayor has a college degree; skill job = 1 if mayor worked in a high skill occupation in
the past; unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; term limit = 1 if mayor is at the second term (i.e. mayor
is term limited); political experience = years of past political experience of the mayor at any level of politics.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
183
Table 3.6: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline, RDD estimates:
Municipalities between 5000-15000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Control Function Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic
Bandwidth h h h h/2 2h 2h
Municipal covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mayoral covariates No No Yes No No No
National Party -0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Outcome mean 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
Bandwidth 6.943 6.943 6.943 3.472 13.89 13.89
Observations 264 264 264 134 496 496
Notes. Municipalities between 5000 and 15000 inhabitants (i.e. municipalities constrained by fiscal
rules). Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Catta-
neo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Treatment variable: National Party
is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national political party. Region and term FE
included in all columns except column (1). Municipal covariates included in columns (2)-(6): pop =
log of municipal population at the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal
population above 65; income = log of income per capita. Mayoral covariates included in column (3):
female = 1 if mayor is a woman; age = age of mayor at the beginning of the term; postgraduate =
1 if mayor has a college degree; skill job = 1 if mayor worked in a high skill occupation in the past;
unemployed = 1 if mayor is unemployed; term limit = 1 if mayor is at the second term (i.e. mayor
is term limited); political experience = years of past political experience of the mayor at any level of
politics. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.9: The role of term limits:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample Term limit Term limit
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.015** -0.001 -0.028*** -0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Outcome mean 0.020 0.012 0.022 0.010
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 7.426 7.426
Observations 716 135 431 420
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules).
Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Description of
sample: Term Limit: No = mixed electoral competition between a first term party-
affiliated mayor vs. a first term independent mayor (i.e. mayors who can re-run for a
second term); Yes = mixed electoral competition between a second term party-affiliated
mayor vs. a second term independent mayor (i.e. term limited mayors). Treatment
variable: National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national
political party. Region and term FE included in all columns. Municipal covariates
included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population at the beginning of the
electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65; income = log
of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.10: The role of re-election:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample mayor mayor mayor mayorre-elected re-elected re-elected re-elected
predicted predicted
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.006 -0.031* -0.009 -0.029**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Outcome mean 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.017
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 14.85 14.85
Observations 258 214 254 218
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules). Electoral
terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Description of sample: mayor re-
elected: No = mayor not re-elected for a second term in the same municipality; Yes = mayor re-
elected for a second term in the same municipality. In column (1)-(2), I am using the observed
re-election status, while in column (3)-(4) the predicted re-election status, as estimated in the
data through a logit model. Treatment variable: National Party is a dummy variable =1
if the mayor is affiliated to a national political party. Region and term FE included in all
columns. Municipal covariates included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population at
the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65;
income = log of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.11: The role of promotion at higher level of government:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample candidate candidate candidate candidateprovincial provincial provincial provincial
level level level level
predicted predicted
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.015** 0.008 -0.016** -0.006
(0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006)
Outcome mean 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.014
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 14.85 14.85
Observations 790 61 631 220
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules). Electoral
terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Description of sample: candidate
provincial level: No = mayor not candidate at provincial level after mayoral term; Yes = mayor
candidate at provincial level after mayoral term. In column (1)-(2), I am using the observed
candidacy status, while in column (3)-(4) the predicted candidacy status, as estimated in the
data through a logit model. Treatment variable: National Party is a dummy variable =1
if the mayor is affiliated to a national political party. Region and term FE included in all
columns. Municipal covariates included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population at
the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65;
income = log of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.12: The role of political orientation:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample Left Party Left Party
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.013* -0.017* -0.022* -0.039***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Outcome mean 0.023 0.013 0.025 0.014
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 7.426 7.426
Observations 480 371 253 204
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules).
Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Description of
sample: Left Party: No = mixed electoral competition between a right-wing party-
affiliated mayor vs. an independent mayor; Yes = mixed electoral competition be-
tween a left-wing party-affiliated mayor vs. an independent mayor. Treatment vari-
able: National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national
political party. Region and term FE included in all columns. Municipal covariates
included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population at the beginning of the
electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65; income = log
of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.13: The role of alignment:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample Aligned Party Aligned Party
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.012 -0.018 -0.024* -0.034**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Outcome mean 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.019
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 7.426 7.426
Observations 565 718 312 392
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal
rules). Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using
the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector.
Description of sample: Aligned Party: No = mixed electoral competition between a
party-affiliated mayor who is not aligned with central government vs. an indepen-
dent mayor; Yes = mixed electoral competition between a party-affiliated mayor
who is aligned with central government vs. an independent mayor. Treatment vari-
able: National Party is a dummy variable =1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national
political party. Region and term FE included in all columns. Municipal covariates
included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population at the beginning of the
electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above 65; income =
log of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.14: The role of criminal organizations:
Municipalities below 5000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Average deficit as a fraction of total revenues
Sample Mafia index>median Mafia index>median
No Yes No Yes
National Party -0.016** -0.013 -0.020** -0.027**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Outcome mean 0.020 0.017 0.021 0.019
Bandwidth 14.85 14.85 7.426 7.426
Observations 381 470 206 251
Notes. Municipalities below 5000 (i.e. municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules).
Electoral terms between 2000 and 2012. Estimation by RDD-LLR using the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) optimal bandwidth h selector. Description of sample:
Mafia index>median = No if municipality is located in a province with a low presence of
Mafia style criminal organizations. Mafia index>median = Yes if municipality is located
in a province with a high presence of Mafia style criminal organizations. The mafia index
comes from Calderoni (2011). Treatment variable: National Party is a dummy variable
=1 if the mayor is affiliated to a national political party. Region and term FE included in all
columns. Municipal covariates included in all columns: pop = log of municipal population
at the beginning of the electoral term; elderly index = ratio of municipal population above
65; income = log of income per capita. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of party-affiliated mayors in Italian municipalities
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Notes. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Years from 1996 to 2014. Horizontal axis: years. Vertical
axis: % of mayors who are affiliated to national political parties.
193
Figure 3.2: Frequency of margin of victory in mix electoral competitons
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Notes. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012. Frequency of
municipal elections between 2000 and 2012. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate is from a national party,
MVit < 0 when the winning candidate is independent.
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of margin of victory in mix electoral competitons
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Notes. All municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012. Frequency of municipal
elections between 2000 and 2012. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate is from a national party, MVit < 0
when the winning candidate is independent.
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Figure 3.4: McCrary (2008) Test
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Notes. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012. Frequency of
municipal elections between 2000 and 2012. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate is from a national
party, MVit < 0 when the winning candidate is independent. Discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.112,
standard error 0.086 and t-statistic -1.297.
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Figure 3.5: McCrary (2008) Test
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Notes. All municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012. Frequency of municipal
elections between 2000 and 2012. MVit > 0 when the winning candidate is from a national party, MVit < 0
when the winning candidate is independent. Discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.157, standard error
0.108 and t-statistic -1.461.
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Figure 3.6: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline
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Notes. RDD estimates. All municipalities below 15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012.
Horizontal axis: margin of victory in mixed electoral competitions between party-affiliated mayors and
independent ones. Vertical axis: average deficit as a fraction of total municipal revenues. Scatter points
are averaged over bins of 1 % of the margin of victory. The central blue line represents a split second-
order polynomial of the outcome variable in the the margin of victory, fitted separately on each side of the
threshold.The green lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 3.7: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline, municipalities
below 5000
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
%
 d
ef
ic
it
-20 -10 0 10 20
MV national party
Notes. RDD estimates. All municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to 2012.
Horizontal axis: margin of victory in mixed electoral competitions between party-affiliated mayors and
independent ones. Vertical axis: average deficit as a fraction of total municipal revenues. Scatter points
are averaged over bins of 1 % of the margin of victory. The central blue line represents a split second-
order polynomial of the outcome variable in the the margin of victory, fitted separately on each side of the
threshold.The green lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 3.8: The effect of national party on fiscal discipline, municipalities
above 5000
-.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
%
 d
ef
ic
it
-20 -10 0 10 20
MV national party
Notes. RDD estimates. All municipalities between 5000-15000 inhabitants. Electoral terms from 2000 to
2012. Horizontal axis: margin of victory in mixed electoral competitions between party-affiliated mayors
and independent ones. Vertical axis: average deficit as a fraction of total municipal revenues. Scatter points
are averaged over bins of 1 % of the margin of victory. The central blue line represents a split second-
order polynomial of the outcome variable in the the margin of victory, fitted separately on each side of the
threshold.The green lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Appendix
This Appendix provides additional results and robustness checks, which are
also discussed in the paper. In particular, I report the following Tables:
• Table A1: Discontinuities in municipal and mayoral characteristics,
RDD estimates, municipalities below 5000
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